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‘The essence of government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will 
ever be liable to abuse.’ 
 –James Madison 
 
  
2 
I. Introduction: Responsibility of international organizations and the 
development of the rights of victims 
 
In the globalized world today the exercise of governmental authority is no longer in the hands 
of states alone. International organizations have not only risen in number, but also with regards 
to their competence and functions in the international fora. International organizations have 
developed into powerful and independent subjects of international law that create international 
law binding on states and exercise powers that affect the lives of millions of individuals. 
International organizations today perform significant governmental functions independently 
from states and even exercise jurisdiction over territories.1  
The laws and principles regarding international institutions, especially those of responsibility 
and accountability have unfortunately not developed in similar speed. With international 
organizations, there is often an assumption that they are a force for good and there is no wrong 
they could commit.2 However, it is a universally accepted principle emanating from the ideals 
of democracy that with powers of government comes responsibility and that the rights of 
individuals need to be protected by the rule of law.3  
This study looks at the responsibility of international organizations, especially in the context 
of humanitarian action. Humanitarian actions or humanitarianism is meant as efforts to 
alleviate suffering of people affected by natural or manmade disasters or conflict. Humanitarian 
actions are founded upon the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, such as humanity, impartiality and neutrality.4 The principles call for 
preventing and alleviating human suffering, ‘ensuring the respect for the human being’5. The 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) has called for the respect of the fundamental 
principles of humanitarian assistance6 and emphasized its own ‘unique role … in providing 
leadership and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support the affected 
countries.’7  
Humanitarian action includes a variety of functions such as humanitarian relief in the form of 
food and shelter all the way to bringing peace and security through armed interventions. Armed 
interventions under the auspices of humanitarianism are possible in the name of protecting 
international peace and security with aspirations of respect for human rights and supporting 
                                                 
1 Unites Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, authorized ‘the Secretary-General, 
with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo 
in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo [...]’.  
2 Jan Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2009), 33. 
3 See e.g. the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217A (III), 
U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) and Article 2 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 
16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171 (hereinafter ICCPR). 
4 See e.g. The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement regarding its 
humanitarian work: Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, commentary (1979), at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-principles-commentary-010179.htm (14. 
January 2015).  
5 Ibid. 
6 GA resolutions ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United 
Nations’ A/RES/46/182, 78th plenary meeting, 19 December 1991 and Fifty-eighth session A/RES/58/114, 5 
February 2004. 
7 Ibid. A/RES/46/182, para 12. 
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accountability. UN peacekeeping operations are used regularly to pursue these goals. However, 
as the functions of international organizations in general, UN peacekeeping has also moved 
beyond its traditional role of monitoring peace agreements. The UN Security Council (SC) 
authorizations today are not what was originally intended with regard to the level of global 
governance in the affected areas and the role of the troop contributing states and the 
international organizations.  
International organizations working in the humanitarian field have significant influence and 
power over their subjects and their fundamental rights. Those subjects, the individuals behind 
the elaborate mandates of action, are often completely dependent on the assistance of 
international organizations and their primary protector, the nation state, has failed them. In the 
recent decades international law has developed to increase human rights protections and to 
fight impunity in bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice regardless of their rank 
or position. However, these developments have not reached international organizations, 
especially the UN. 
Traditionally, states are seen as the primary subjects of international law with international 
organizations acting under their patronage and control. However, reality has not reflected these 
attitudes for the better part of the nineteenth century and finally in 2002, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) started its work on drafting articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations.8 The draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations  
(hereinafter DARIO) were modelled after the draft articles on the responsibility of states 
(hereinafter ARSIWA)9 and accepted on first reading in 2011. Although the drafting of the 
DARIO was seemingly effortless and quick, they have received a lot of criticism. Many of its 
provisions are considered progressive development, rather than codification of international 
law and some of the provisions are considered unclear, contradictory and not representative of 
valid rules of international responsibility.  
This study will focus on some of the most problematic provisions of the DARIO, which seem 
to hinder the realizations of the responsibility of international organizations. Part II of the study 
will first look at the tensions and correlations between states and international organizations as 
subjects of international law. States are considered sui generis, where all states are equal and 
possess the same rights and obligations. International organizations are recognized as subjects 
of international law under the principle of speciality, which is seen as limiting its competences 
compared to those of states.10 The notion of the legal personality of international organizations 
                                                 
8 Draft articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries 2011, Report of the ILC 
on the Work of its Sixty-third Session, GA Official Records, Sixty-sixth Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/66/10), 
(hereinafter DARIO commentaries), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. 
9 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, ILC, 
fifty-third session, in 2001, (A/56/10) YILC, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected. 
10 The plethora of different types of international organizations is recognized and for the purposes of this study 
international organization means intergovernmental organizations (IGO). Proper scrutiny of different types of 
other international organizations requires further study beyond the scope of this one. There are different ways of 
categorizing international organizations and emphasis of different characteristic for the purposes of indicating 
international legal personality, lead to different results. For instance, non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
are organizations, which are constituted separate from the government of the country in which they are founded. 
NGOs are generally not established by a treaty governed by international law and often perform functions that 
may not be described as ‘governmental’. However, the separation between IGOs and non-governmental 
organizations (hereinafter NGO) is not clear and e.g. the ICRC has functions that are considered governmental.  
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has, however, changed over the course of years and e.g. the UN exercises some powers that go 
even beyond those of states. 
Further, the special nature and functions of international organizations, usually expressed in 
the founding documents and other rules of the organization, actually allows significant 
exceptions to the general rules of responsibility unprecedented in light of state responsibility, 
to the point of making the general provisions of the DARIO redundant. Under the cloak of the 
principle of speciality, international organizations may pick and choose which provisions of 
international responsibility they choose to follow. The UN even has its own provision in the 
DARIO, giving priority to the UN Charter11 over any provisions of the DARIO.  
Part II will also focus on the rules regarding the attribution of conduct to international 
organizations. The study will look at some recent jurisprudence and scholarly opinions, which 
indicate that the attribution rules that were adopted in the DARIO are considered unclear, 
lacking support from jurisprudence and progressive law-creating rather than codification.  
Part III of the study looks at primary rules of international law, the obligations that are binding 
on international organizations.12 The study looks at international human rights norms and the 
increasing demands to uphold them in all forms of government. Human rights instruments are 
usually addressed to states, but increasingly also international organizations are considered 
obliged to fulfil human rights obligations, due to their state-like functions i.e. exercise of 
governmental authority. Further, the largest humanitarian organization, the UN, is also the 
creator, protector and guardian of many of the core human rights documents and it names 
protection of human rights and support of accountability one of its main tasks in its 
peacekeeping missions.13 However, criticism of humanitarian organizations is often met with 
hostility and is perceived as unwarranted, as looking a gift-horse in the mouth. Not only is the 
responsibility of international humanitarian organizations difficult to approach morally, but 
also legally. Questions of accountability and consequences for breaches of international law, 
such as human rights norms is not emphasized properly and often not even addressed in 
international treaties or guidelines concerning humanitarian action.14  
In recent decades international organizations, such as the UN, have been implicated in serious 
human rights violations and international crimes. Humanitarian circles and the academic world 
has slowly started to accept the fact that even international organizations devoted to 
humanitarian causes may commit violations of international law, breaching thus the very 
fundamental rights they are mandated to protect.15  
                                                 
11 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, The United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 26 to June 26, 1945: Selected 
Documents (United States Department of State: Washington, 1946) xv, and 335; amendments by General 
Assembly Resolutions in United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 557, 143/638, 308/892, 119, 173 
12 This study does not address questions of liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited 
by international law. 
13 Protection of civilians, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/humanrights.shtml, 14 January 2015. 
Human rights, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/humanrights.shtml, 14 January 2015. 
14 E.g. Article 9 The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994, publication reference 1067, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm) mentions accountability and 
transparency, but indicates rather economical prudence and due diligence regarding funds and does not address 
issues of abuse in other sense. 
15 Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional 
Necessity Concerns, 36 Virginia Journal of international law (1995) 53-167, at 97-98. 
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The development of restorative justice, demanding effective procedural rights to victims in 
legal process, is a central part of this study. Victims are often portrayed as passive, weak and 
helpless. Subjects of humanitarian actions, individuals, are already considered as victims of 
some sort, who are passive beneficiaries of charitable aid and goodwill. They are not seen as 
bearers of rights to effective legal remedies, or having the capabilities of taking an active role 
in litigation. However, recent studies have showed that victims do actually want a more active 
role in the process and that brings empowerment. Yet in reality the victims of abuse by 
international humanitarian organizations are not awarded any moral authority to bring their 
cases to the forefront and are not seen as legal subjects entitled to legal securities and 
reparations.16 International humanitarian organizations have significant influence over the 
fundamental rights of millions of individuals and it is imperative that they start to follow human 
rights norms and allow access to effective legal remedies to victims.  
Part IV the study looks at another hindrance to the responsibility of international organizations, 
their privileges and immunities. Most international humanitarian organizations have an 
agreement that grants them immunity from the national jurisdiction of states, which are often 
extensive, covering civil as well as criminal matters. International organizations have been able 
to function in virtual impunity. The UN is said to have absolute immunity and it seems in some 
respects even more extensive than the personal immunities awarded to highest state officials. 
Although the UN has the right and the duty to waive immunity when it would impede the 
course of justice, it has never done it.  
What is the reality that follows these practices? One recent example from Haiti is sadly a very 
common example. In 2012 three Pakistani soldiers working in the UN peacekeeping operation 
MINUSTAH were convicted of raping a 14-year old Haitian boy while on mission in Gonaïves, 
Northern Haiti. The men were sentenced to one-year imprisonment by a military tribunal in 
Pakistan without almost any public record or access to the public.17 The UN did not provide 
reparations or take any responsibility in the affair. Amnesty International called the sentences 
‘a travesty of justice’. Other similar types of cases have arisen in Haiti and the UN 
peacekeeping operation has been met with riots and hostility. It is safe to say that the credibility 
of the UN mission has been seriously compromised. Amnesty has said that ‘[c]ases of sexual 
abuse should never be dealt with in military courts, rather in civilian courts prepared to deal 
with human rights issues.’18  
Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said it well in their report about their experiences 
with the peacekeeping forces stating that the UN has to be told ‘what they need to know, not 
simply what they want to hear.’ and that describing the negative as well as the positive 
experiences are important in strengthening the UN’s ability to fulfil its mission.19 The success 
                                                 
16 Mark Pallis, The Operation Of UNHCR's Accountability Mechanisms, 37 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, (2004-2005) 869-918 at p. 908-909, at 908-909. 
17 Javier Zúñiga, special adviser at Amnesty International in Nita Bhalla: UN must review policy on 
peacekeepers who abuse –Amnesty, http://www.trust.org/item/?map=un-must-review-policy-on-peacekeepers-
who-abuse-amnesty 16 May 2014. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Elisabeth Rehn, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Women, war and peace: the independent experts' assessment on the 
impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peace-building, (United Nations Development Fund for 
Women (hereinafter UNIFEM), 2002), at 61-62. 
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of missions and the credibility of international organizations as a whole make recognition of 
responsibility and effective legal remedies to victims imperative. 
II. Responsibility under international law  
 
1. Developments of international responsibility 
 
1.1. States as primary subjects of international responsibility 
 
The responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts carries longer traditions of 
responsibility than any other actor in the international field, due to their primacy historically in 
the international legal system. States have the most international obligations and they carry the 
primary burden of compliance under international law. However, international organizations 
have developed into powerful and independent entities in the international for a alongside 
states. One might even say, they sometimes even surpass the competence of states. This chapter 
discusses briefly the responsibility of states as a background and comparison point to the 
responsibility of international organizations. Rules that apply to the responsibility of states 
affect a great deal the formulation and interpretation of the rules regarding the responsibility 
of international organizations.  
One of the most settled principles of international law is related to international responsibility 
was first laid down by the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PICJ) in the 
Chorzów Factory case. The ICJ held that ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach 
of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.’20 In the case 
Germany brought action against Poland demanding reparation for taking possession of two 
nitrate factories in Chorzów, contrary to an agreement between the states.21 The PCIJ has 
applied the principle in a number of cases.22 States are internationally responsible for their 
actions and they have to act according to their undertakings, customary international law and 
binding decisions of the ICJ.23  
The principle is codified in the first article of the ARSIWA formulated by theILC: ‘Every 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that state.’ The 
ARSIWA were codified over a period of almost 50 years starting from 1949. Although the 
articles are not legally binding, they are significant.24   
The ARSIWA do not define the content of international obligations, the breaches that give rise 
to responsibility i.e. primary rules.25 Sources of international law consist of primary rules and 
                                                 
20 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów /Claim for Indemnity), jurisdiction, [1927] Publ. PCIJ, Series A, 
judgment no. 8, at 21. 
21 Ibid, at 5. 
22 See e.g. Phosphates in Morocco case (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74 , 
p. 10, at p. 28), the PCIJ affirmed that when a state commits an internationally wrongful act against another state 
international responsibility is established immediately between the two states.  The principle has also been 
adopted and applied by numerous arbitral tribunals, e.g. the in the Rainbow Warrior case (Rainbow Warrior 
affair, UNRIAA, vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 215 (1990), p. 251 para. 75.), where it was held that ‘any 
violation by a state of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to state responsibility’. 
23 Kari Hakapää, Uusi kansainvälinen oikeus, (Talentum, 2010), at 295. 
24 Ibid. at 297. Some of the provisions of ARSIWA may be considered to express customary rules of 
international law. 
25 ARSIWA commentaries, ibid. supra note 10, general section (1) at 31. 
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secondary rules.26 Formal sources of international law are expressed in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute.27 The Article 38 itself is a material source of secondary rules. The sources of 
international law are constitutional principles, custom, agreements, general principles  of law, 
instruments issued by international organizations, declarations of principles and case law. 28 
Primary rules of international law are rules and principles that establish the rights and 
obligations for international subjects that give rise to responsibility, such as diplomatic 
privileges and immunities or the prohibition of torture. Secondary rules are applied in order to 
determine what the primary rules are, how they are created and changed. Secondary rules 
determine the existence of a breach of an international obligation and its consequences for the 
responsible entity, but they do not create international responsibilities. The ARSIWA are 
considered to be secondary rules.29  
The binding nature of secondary rules, may be controversial in international law. Article 38 
and the whole doctrine of sources are considered controversial and are not agreed upon by 
international lawyers and is suggested to be out-dated. However, no alternative approach has 
acquired sufficient endorsement to challenge the doctrine of sources.30  
Responsibility of states can be direct or indirect. Direct responsibility means responsibility for 
actions of state organs, agents or other representatives. Indirect responsibility derives from 
actions of private entities that can be seen as acting under the state’s tutelage, excluding 
autonomous persons acting on their own account.31 In theory, the conduct of all individuals, 
from natural persons to corporations, that are linked to the state by nationality, habitual 
residence or incorporation might be attributed to the state, whether or not they have a 
connection to the government. Responsibility is limited to conduct, which engages the state as 
an organization or is instigated by public authority. Conduct, which may be attributed to a state 
at the international level, ‘is that of its organs of government, or others who have acted under 
the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the state.’32 The internal 
laws of a state are primary sources in determining which entities are considered organs of a 
state and their conduct therefore may be attributed to the State.33 However, for the purposes of 
international law it is not sufficient to refer to internal law for the status of state organs. In 
some legal systems the status and functions of state organs may be determined in practice and 
law may be silent on the matter. ‘A state cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body 
which does in truth act as one of its organs merely by denying it that status under its own law.’34 
Further, the different rules of attribution of the ARSIWA have a cumulative effect and ‘a [s]tate 
                                                 
26 See e.g. Hugh Thrilway, Sources of international law, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law, Third 
edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 95-121. 
27 Ibid, supra note 18. 
28 Riccardo Monaco, Sources of international law, in R Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Volume IV (2000), Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, at 467 
29 The distinction between primary and secondary rules comes from book by H.L.A Hart The Concept of Laws 
(Oxford, 1961). 
30 Thrilway, Sources of international law (2010), supra note 26, at 95-121. 
31 See e.g. Rainbow Warrior case UNRIAA, vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 215 (1990), where France was 
found responsible when French security service secret agents sank the Rainbow Warrior by exploding the ship 
in harbour in New Zealand in 1985. 
32 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 38. 
33 Ibid. at 40. 
34 Ibid. at 42.  
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may be responsible for the effects of conduct of private parties, if it failed to take necessary 
measures to prevent those effects.’35  
A mere factual causal link is not sufficient for the attribution of conduct to the state as a subject 
of international law, but is based on criteria determined by international law. Attribution 
establishes that there is an act of the state for the purposes of responsibility, whereas it does 
not express on the legality of the said conduct. In practice there often exists a close link between 
the foundation of attribution and the obligation breached.  
Under articles 2 and 12 of the ARSIWA responsibility does not require fault for it to be 
characterized as internationally wrongful, states may be liable under objective responsibility.36 
In the classic Corfu Channel case37 the ICJ held that the Government of Albania couldn’t be 
imputed merely because of a minefield in its territorial waters. The responsibility cannot arise 
simply because a state has control over its territory. The fault of Albania was based on the fact 
that it failed to warn ships passing through the strait in Albanian waters. The case was brought 
by the United Kingdom against Albania for damages and loss of life it suffered from two mines 
exploding in Albanian waters.  However, the interpretation, of the primary obligation may be 
that fault is a necessary condition for responsibility.38 
In Bosnia Genocide case39, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY) was found 
to have breached its obligation to prevent genocide, relating to the massacre of Srebrenica. In 
1995, the Bosnian Serb Army killed nearly 8000 people in Srebrenica, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bosnia Herzegovina filed an action against the FRY, alleging a violation of the 
Genocide Convention40. When restitution was found to be impossible and compensation not 
appropriate, due to the lack of a ‘sufficiently direct and causal nexus’ between the breach of 
the FRY and the massacre, a declaration was considered to be sufficient to satisfaction.41 The 
ICJ also declared that Serbia should ‘immediately take effective steps to ensure full 
compliance’ with its obligation to punish and transfer individuals accused of genocide for a 
trial by the ICTY and to cooperate fully with the tribunal.42 Even if restitution is not possible 
and there is not a sufficient and direct causal nexus between a breach and the events, states are 
obligated to ensure full compliance with their international obligations. 
Every internationally wrongful act of a state gives rise to new international legal relations 
additional to those that existed before the act took place, just as in any other system of law. 43 
According to an established view by international jurists, a wrongful act may give rise to 
                                                 
35 Ibid. at 39. See also e.g. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, 
p. 3. 
36 Doctrine according to which international responsibility of states might be incurred despite absence of any 
fault on its part, on the basis that a state is responsible for all acts committed by its officers or organs and 
constituting delinquencies under international law, regardless of whether the officers or organs in question have 
acted within the limits of their competence or have exceeded it. 
37 Corfu Channel case Judgment of April 9th, 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4. 
38 James Crawford, Simon Olleson, The Nature and forms of international responsibility, in Malcolm D. Evans 
(ed.) International Law, Third edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), 441-471 at 458. 
39 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports  2007, p. 43 (hereinafter Bosnian Genocide). 
40 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by GA Res. 260 (III) A , 9 
December 1948, in force 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277. 
41 Bosnian Genocide (2007), supra note 39, paras 460-462, 463, 471(5), (9). 
42 Ibid, para. 493 (8). 
43 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 33. 
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several types of legal relations and the consequences of an internationally wrongful act cannot  
be limited either to reparation or sanction.44  
1.2. The relationship of the responsibility of states and international organizations –
developments and problems 
 
The complex and intertwined relationship between states and international organizations was 
recognized early on during the drafting of the ARSIWA.45 It is difficult to determine where the 
responsibility of an international organization begins and the responsibility of member states 
end.46 There is a fundamental tension between international organizations and their members; 
international organizations are on the one hand independent from the members but at the same 
time fundamentally dependent on them.47 The responsibility of international organizations was 
left outside the scope of the ARSIWA by article 57 and ‘any question of the responsibility 
under international law of an international organization, or of any State for the conduct of an 
international organization’ reserving two related issues from the scope of the articles: ‘first, 
any question involving the responsibility of international organizations, and secondly, any 
question concerning the responsibility of any state for the conduct of an international 
organization.’48 The ARSIWA do not cover actions taken by an international organization, 
even though member states may direct or control its conduct.49 Formally the question does fall 
under the scope of the ARSIWA, but because of the complicated questions related to the 
functioning of international organizations, the issue was left out.50 The scope of article 57 is 
narrow covering ‘only what is sometimes referred to as the derivative or secondary liability of 
member states for the acts or debts of an international organization.’51 
The DARIO follows a formulation that seemingly corresponds in most part the ARSIWA, 
however it has been made for ‘appropriate reasons’ not assuming that the same principles 
apply.52 During the drafting of the DARIO there was continual criticism that the DARIO 
follows the structure and contents of the ARSIWA too closely. However, according to the 
Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja several draft articles of the DARIO contain significant 
                                                 
44 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 33. 
45 First report on the responsibility of international organizations by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur ILC 
Fifty-fifth session Geneva, 5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2003, A/CN.4/532, Section II, at 2-7, paras 3-11. 
See also A/CN.4/152, Report by Mr. R. Ago, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility 
Topic: State responsibility, extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YILC)1963 ,vol. II, 
footnote 2, at 228. Further, YILC, 1974, vol I, 1278th meeting, para. 39, at 154: On the first reading of the 
ARSIWA it was suggested that article 6 would have included ‘the conduct of an organ of an organ placed at the 
disposal by another state or an international organization.’ International organizations were removed from the 
provision. 
46 The ILC stipulated later that the attribution rule in article 7 of DARIO rather determines the responsibility 
between states and international organizations and not general attribution. Dual attribution where  both an 
international organization and a state can be responsible for the same conduct is also possible, DARIO 
commentaries, supra note 8, at 88-93. 
47 Klabbers, International institutional law (2009), supra note 2, at 35-36. 
48 Article 57 of the ARSIWA: ‘These articles are without prejudice to any question of the responsibility under 
international law of an international organization, or of any state for the conduct of an international 
organization.’ 
49 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 137. 
50 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 141-142. 
51 Ibid. 
52 DARIO commentaries, supra note 8, at 2. 
10 
changes in order to reflect the particular situation of international organizations and that various 
DARIO articles consider issues that have not been included in the ARSIWA.53  
Another criticism has been that some DARIO articles are based on limited practice.54 Special 
Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja recognizes that practice concerning the responsibility of international 
organizations is limited, mostly due to the fact that practice concerning the responsibility of 
international organizations has developed only fairly recently.55 Further, most organizations 
are reluctant to submit their disputes with states or other organizations to third-party settlement 
and the availability of such practice for the ILC has been limited.56 Moreover, despite the ILCs 
efforts to acquire knowledge from relevant practice, states and international organizations have 
contributed only a few instances of unpublished practice to the ILC and academic writings are 
not sufficient in bringing relevant practice to light.57 
It was recognized in the DARIO commentaries that the limited practice behind the articles 
makes them closer to progressive development of international law than representing 
codification.58 Some of the articles on the responsibility of international organizations have 
been drawn from some analogous conclusions from the ARSIWA. It has recognized that more 
so than the ARSIWA, the DARIO is not so much codifying but more law-creating.59 The ILC 
submitted that the DARIO might not necessarily have the same authority as the corresponding 
articles of the ARSIWA and their level of authority will depend upon how they are received.60 
The DARIO address the responsibility of states in many of the articles. According to article 1 
paragraph 2 of the DARIO ‘the … draft articles also apply to the international responsibility 
of a state for an internationally wrongful act in connection with the conduct of an international 
organization.’ A few draft articles in Part Five of the DARIO, consider the responsibility of a 
state for the conduct of an international organization in circumstances where the conduct in 
question would generally be attributed to the international organization. In situations of 
coercion and circumvention of international obligations by a member state of an international 
organization, the conduct will not entail the responsibility of an international organization.61  
The responsibility of international organizations is more extensive in some cases than the 
corresponding provisions on state responsibility. In the commentaries to article 7 of DARIO 
all acts are included in the conduct that may be attributable to an international organization. 
State responsibility is limited only to acts that are considered exercise of governmental 
authority. Also article 6 of DARIO contains organs and agents when article 4 of ARSIWA 
includes only organs of the state.  
Although the independence and competence of international organizations has grown, they are 
often considered to lack some characteristics that states possess. States are considered sui 
generis; to having a general competence and that each state is equal in its rights and obligations 
                                                 
53 Eighth report on responsibility of international organizations by Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, ILC Sixty-
third session Geneva, 26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, A/CN.4/640, at 5, para. 5. 
54 Ibid, at 5-6, para. 6. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, at 2. 
57 Ibid, at 5-6. 
58 DARIO commentaries, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Articles 60, 61 of DARIO. 
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in the international fora. International organizations are considered to have special 
competences, due to the fact that they are established by treaties to exercise specific functions. 
International organizations differ from one another e.g. with regards to their powers and 
functions, size of membership, relations between the organization and its members, structure 
and facilities and also regarding the treaty obligations that bind them.62 The special nature of 
the founding documents of international organizations was taken into consideration by the lex 
specialis rule of article 64 of DARIO.63 This provision has proved to be more problematic than 
expected in finding a balance between the general rules of the DARIO in relation to the special 
rules on different organizations.  
There are many inconsistencies with regards to whether a certain act or omission falls under 
the responsibility of an international organization or a state by attribution of conduct.64 Given 
the fact that there exists a myriad of different international organizations that have separate 
rules and relationships with states and other international organizations, one has to assume that 
often these questions can ultimately be answered on a case-by-case basis.  
 
  
                                                 
62 See DARIO commentaries, supra note 8 at 3, para. (7). 
63 The principle lex specialis derogat legi generali means that in a situation where two laws govern a similar 
factual situation, the law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a general law (lex 
generalis). The DARIO expresses the legi generali, while a specific treaty might express a lex specialis. 
Article 64 of DARIO:  
‘These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization, 
or a State in connection with the conduct of an international organization, are governed by special rules of 
international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization 
applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members.’ 
64 Report of the ILC, Sixty-first session (4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2009), GA Official Records, Sixty-
fourth session Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), para. 27 that: 
‘Certain issues concerning international responsibility between States and international organizations have not 
been expressly covered either in the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts or in 
the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations These issues include the following 
questions: (a) when is conduct of an organ of an international organization placed at the disposal of a State 
attributable to the latter?; (b) when is consent given by an international organization to the commission of a 
given act by a State a circumstance precluding wrongfulness of that State’s conduct?; (c) when is an 
international organization entitled to invoke the responsibility of a State? One could argue that these questions 
are regulated by analogy in the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. 
However, one may wish that the Commission addresses these questions expressly. If the latter view is preferred, 
in what form (draft articles, report or other) should these questions be considered?’ 
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2. Responsibility of international organizations 
 
2.1. International organizations as subjects of international law: separate legal personality 
 
International organizations have existed throughout recorded history, but modern international 
organizations in the form they are known today have developed since the nineteenth century. 65 
Modern international organizations have quickly developed with regards to their competence 
in international affairs, creating their own bodies of international law, binding also their former 
masters, states. Their internal institutions have formed into sophisticated administrations that 
operate independently from their members. The League of Nations (1920-1946) was the first 
international organization to set aims to guaranteeing peace and a system of collective security 
for its members. Although it failed to fulfil its purpose of preventing war, it paved way for the 
UN that was established after the Second World War. Today the UN is a powerful global 
organization and its functions include the maintenance of international peace and security.66 
Although international organizations may have similar competences than states, they are still 
often regarded as limited to exercise specific functions, under the principle of speciality. Unlike 
states, who are sui generis, treated as equals and similar, international organizations are a 
motley crew, based on not only their functions, but also regarding the relations between the 
organization and its members, the primary rules which bind them, etc. This has made it harder 
to develop a cohesive body of law regarding all international organizations and the principle 
of speciality brings a complicating element in applying general rules to the responsibility of 
international organizations.  
The principle of speciality that indicates the special functions of international organizations is 
also origin to another principle, the functional necessity principle. Functional necessity means 
that international law grants substantive rights and obligations to international organizations 
conditionally, as opposed to states that have rights and obligations simply by their statehood, 
and are immune from suit for governmental activities, (acta jure imperii). Although it may 
seem limiting the competences of international organizations, functional necessity is actually 
biased in favour of international organizations and is based on assumption that international 
organizations are for the good and the actions they make are infallible and cannot be regarded 
as ill-motivated in any way.67 Therefore, especially the responsibility of international 
humanitarian organizations and e.g. the UN is hard to reason, because the international 
community assumes and accepts blindly that they are working for the greater good and any 
misconduct is seen as a mistake within the boundaries of functional necessity.  
International organizations are established by international treaties or other instruments 
governed by international law, and may in addition have decisions, resolutions and other acts 
binding on them. Among those instruments, the provision on the accountability and 
responsibility of the organization is often left unaddressed. This seems to be due to the fact that 
international organization are still seen as annexes of states, although in situations of foul play, 
                                                 
65 Klabbers, International institutional law (2009), supra note 2, at 14. 
66 Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 11. 
67 Klabbers, International institutional law (2009), supra note 2 at 33. 
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states are quick to defer responsibility to the independent international organization instead of 
them.  
The responsibility of international organizations gained more attention in the 1980s after the 
collapse of the International Tin Council (ITC), when the issue of responsibility for the 
undertakings of the ITC.68 The situation was ensued by numerous litigations. One of the biggest 
problems was that there was no responsibility clause in the constituent document of the ITC. 
Because international organizations are often creations of states, it is not easy to determine 
whether the organization can be held responsible independently for internationally wrongful 
acts and whose actions qualify and who is responsible.69 The ARSIWA do not address the issue 
of separate responsibility of international organizations and states in situations where for 
example an internationally wrongful act of an organization is actually an expression of the will 
of its member states. 
Critical legal studies have pointed out, that there exists an unsolvable tension between 
considerations of community and sovereignty. With regards to law of international 
organizations, this means tensions between the implied powers doctrine on the one hand, 
according to which an international organization may possess implied legal powers even 
though they have not been explicitly granted to it. On the other hand there is the principle of 
attribution of powers or principle of speciality according to which international organizations 
can only act within the limits of the powers that have been attributed to it. Although taking 
away from legal certainty, the critical theory can provide the reader to relativism that is present 
in making legal decisions and to realize there are no certainties to offer.  70 
Although the DARIO were accepted on the first reading by the ILC, the responsibility of 
international organizations is still considered to be an under-developed area.71  
 
2.1.1. Theories of international law 
 
The legal theory of international organizations is quite underdeveloped.72 Especially in the field 
of international responsibility there are a number of questions; whether and under what 
circumstances an international organization can be held responsible and what is the relationship 
of the organization to its members and to their responsibility under international law. One point 
of contention in accepting the international organization as subjects of international law is the 
definition; what types of international organizations are considered to have a legal personality, 
similar to that of states. The responsibility under international law may arise only for a subject 
of international law.73 A subject must possess a legal personality and be the bearer of rights 
and obligations under international law. In order to have a legal personality, an international 
                                                 
68 Ibid. at 272. 
69 Ibid., at 271. 
70 Ibid. at 3-6. 
71 Crawford, Olleson, the Nature and forms of international responsibility, in International Law (2010), supra 
note 38, at 441. First report on the responsibility of international organizations, (2003), supra note 45, at 17, 
para. 31: The DARIO do not handle questions of civil liability and international liability for acts not prohibited 
by international law. 
72 Klabbers, international institutional law (2009), supra note 2 at 3-4. 
73 First report on responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 8, para. 15. 
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organization has to be a separate legal entity with a will and powers to act on its own i.e. have 
independence from its members.  
There are many legal theories under which legal personality is defined. One of those theories 
is the ‘will theory’, according to which the will of the founders of an international organization 
determines whether the organization has a legal personality.74 If the will of free states is for an 
organization to have legal personality, it should be respected. However, very few constituent 
treaties establishing an organization explicitly express the intention of its founders in this 
matter. Also, other states or entities might not recognize those intentions, which could make 
the declaration of a legal personality unavailing. According to Klabbers, the emphasis of the 
recognition of third parties, which is often resorted to by the ‘will theorists’, render the primary 
notion of the will of the founders unsustainable.75 
According to the ‘objective-theory’, an entity has international legal personality as soon as it 
exists as a matter of law (not including or depending on the will of the founders).76 The 
objective theory sets criteria to reaching legal personality, the important one being the 
possession of a will distinct of its members. However, the notion of ‘distinct will’ can also be 
called into question, especially decisions made by unanimous expression of the members.77  
Under the ‘presumptive personality’ theory an organization is presumed to have international 
legal personality, once the organization performs acts that can only be explained on the basis 
of international legal personality. Legal personality is presumed and may be rebutted in case 
evidence points to the other direction.78 The landmark Reparations for Injuries case79 before 
the ICJ, is said to reflect the presumptive theory, despite the fact that the States establishing 
the UN had specifically expressed that the UN should not have a separate legal personality80: 
‘fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community,  had 
the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing 
objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, 
together with capacity to bring international claims.’ 
The 1949 Reparations for Injuries case is significant, because for the first time international 
organizations were recognized as having a legal personality, as subjects of international law. 
The case stemmed from the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, UN Mediator and several 
of his associates in Palestine, in 1948. The UN GA asked the ICJ whether the UN has the 
capacity, in the circumstances where a UN agent has suffered injury involving the 
responsibility of a state to bring an international claim against the responsible government, and 
secondly, if the UN has such capacity, how does it relate to the rights of the state whose national 
the injured agent was.81 The ICJ recognized the UN as an international person under the 
decision.82 Although Article 104 of the UN Charter obliges member states of the UN to give 
legal capacity for the organization to exercise its functions and to recognize it under their 
                                                 
74 Klabbers International institutional law (2009), ibid. supra note 2, at 47. 
75 Ibid. at 48. 
76 Ibid. 49. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. at 49-51. 
79 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, p.174, at 185. 
80 Klabbers, International institutional law (2009), supra note 2, at 50. 
81 Ibid. at 5. 
82 Reparations for injuries (1949), supra note 79, 179. 
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national laws, it is only binding on members. The problem with defining legal personality 
solely based on constitutive documents of an organization is the relationship and status with 
non-members. Constitutive documents or rules of an international organization do not bind 
non-members.  
A treaty is binding only on the members of that treaty (res inter alios acta nec nocet nec 
prodest). The basis for the binding nature of treaties comes from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. It is expressed e.g. in VCLT Article 26: ‘Every treaty is binding upon the parties to 
it and must be performed by them in good faith.’  A rule may also be taken and applied in 
practice by a non-member state to a treaty to an extent that it can becomes a customary rule. A 
rule of international law may form into a customary rule when two requirements are met: 
factual and psychological. The first element requires that the rule is applied in state practice 
uniformly and continuously over years of the same behaviour. The psychological element 
indicates opinio juris, which means conviction to the behaviour, state practice.83 In the North 
Sea Continental Shelf case, concerning the determination of maritime borders of the North Sea, 
expressed the two-element theory of customary law. The case was a dispute between Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, when Denmark and the Netherlands wanted to apply the 
equidistance principle the Continental Shelf Convention84 to the delimitation of the maritime 
borders. Germany disagreed and wanted to apply the just and equitable apportionment. The 
verdict, contemplating whether the equidistance principle is a customary rule of internationa l 
law, expressed the two-element theory: 
‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or 
be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, Le., the existence of a 
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.’85  
The elements of practice and opinio juris are intertwined, but especially opinio juris is difficult 
to attribute, because it is a ‘state of mind’86 element by nature and the attribution requires a 
consciousness of conforming to a rule. Unless the psychological motivations are different in 
conforming to a rule, opinio juris does not apply. Treaties may also be ‘law-making type’ of 
treaties where a state may be bound simply by its conduct, however very limitedly, as expressed 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.87 The ICJ held that ‘only a very definite, very 
consistent course of conduct on the part of a state’, could justify the application of a treaty to a 
non-member state.88 
There are also views that consider the premise of determining the legal personality of an 
international organization from the ‘standard’ of the state is problematic.89 According to 
Professor Catherine Brölmann, ‘next to the necessity to fill a conceptual lacuna regarding 
international organizations, the central issue in practice is that the flexible institutional veil 
                                                 
83 Monaco, Sources of international law (2000), supra note 28, at 469. 
84 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 29 April 1958, UNTS, vol. 499, p. 311. 
85 North Sea Continental Shelf", Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at 44 para. 77. (See also e.g. Continental 
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13, para 27; Military And Paramilitary 
Activities In And Against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p. 14, paras 183 and 207. 
86 Hugh Thirlway, Sources of international law (2010), see supra note 26, at 103. 
87 North Sea Continental Shelf, (1969) at 3. 
88 Ibid, at 26-27, para. 27-28. See also e.g. Thirlway, Sources of international law (2010), at 95-121. 
89 Catherine Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law, International Organisations & the 
Law of Treaties, Hart Publishing, Oxford (2007). 
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creates uncertainties about accountability at the various levels of decision-making authority.’90 
The institutional veil refers to the structure of international organizations as partly closed in 
the way of states and partly open in the way that it blends with general international law; 
international organizations are formed by competing parts of serving as a forum for states but 
also as an independent actor.91 The treaty making of international organizations, when looked 
at broadly, changes the institutional veil in appearance depending on the context.92 Brölmann 
discusses the different legal theories regarding the legal personality of international 
organizations, stating that there still is no general agreement whether the will theory, as a more 
subjective theory, or the objective theory is more convincing.93 
 
 
2.1.2. Elements of separate legal personality 
 
An entity is considered to possess a legal personality, as a subject of international law, if even 
a single obligation has been imposed on it under international law.94 Legal personality under 
domestic law does not imply legal personality under international law. When an organization 
does not operate under international law, but under national legal systems of states, even it may 
be founded by states, it is not a subject of international law.95 On the other hand, the absence 
of legal personality under domestic law does not mean the absence of legal personality under 
international law.96  
An international organization must also have an objective legal personality; it needs to act 
independently from its members.97 An objective legal personality is often considered narrow, 
regarding only its relationship with the members of the organization. However, it is not a 
logically necessary assumption and e.g. concluding headquarters agreements between an 
international organization and a non-member, in itself, includes recognition of the legal 
personality.98  
An international organization has to have permanence with regards to its organs and its 
functions. However, an international organization can be terminable and founded for a set 
period of time.99 Other characteristics are the treaty basis of the organisation, functions, 
stability and organs and the fact that it is not under any other subject of international law.100 
Considering the variety and heterogeneous nature of international organizations, the ILC has 
taken the approach that international organizations have a legal personality when they are in 
fact acting as separate entities and expressing independent will from their member states by 
                                                 
90 Ibid. at 6. 
91 Ibid. at 30. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. at 97. 
94 First report on the responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 8, para 15. 
95 Hakapää (2010), supra note 21, at 117. 
96 First report on the responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 8, para. 18. 
97 Ibid. at 8, para. 19. 
98 Ibid. at 11, para 19. 
99 Hakapää (2010), supra note 21, at 117. 
100 Ibid. 
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being able to produce consequences outside the organization itself, i.e. have an ‘objective legal 
personality’.101 
Defining the actions and functions performed by international organizations bring a key 
element in defining the ‘international organization’. The ILC stressed the exercise of 
‘governmental’ functions as being the critical factors rather than the foundation and form of an 
international organization.102 Governmental functions mean legislative, executive or judicial 
acts and functions usually exercised by states.103 The exercise of these governmental functions, 
separate from its member states, amount to that organization being responsible under 
international law.104  
 
 
2.1.3. The ‘Intergovernmental Organization’ 
 
International organizations that have separate legal personality under international law are 
generally specified as intergovernmental organizations, possessing certain features that not all 
international organizations have. Although, the ILC stressed the importance of the exercise of 
governmental functions over the foundation and the form of an organization,105 
intergovernmental organizations are generally established by a treaty, whereas NGOs are 
established by instruments that are not governed by international law.106 It has been submitted 
though that the Reparations for injuries opinion of the ICJ means that subjects of international 
legal system can change and expand depending on the needs of the international community 
and requirements of international life.107 Many NGOs have strong missions in humanitarian 
action, however their mandates are not endorsed by states in a similar way as with 
intergovernmental organizations and are self-created.108 
                                                 
101 First report on the responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 11, para 19, see also 
text in note 54. 
102 Ibid. at 15, para. 26. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. at 15, para. 27. If an international organization exercises a certain governmental function as an organ of 
a state, the conduct should be attributed to the state or states concerned. 
105 Ibid. at 15, para. 26. 
106 Ibid. at 8, para. 14. 
107 Robert McCorquodale, The Individual in the International Legal System, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), in 
International Law, Third edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), 284-310, at 287. See Reparations for injuries 
(1949), supra note 79, at 178-179: 
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international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims.’ 
108 Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study, International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, 2007, at 33. 
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Several international conventions concisely define the ‘international organization’ as meaning 
specifically ‘intergovernmental organization’, where members consist only of states as 
members. For instance, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 
(VCLT)109 Article 2.110 The text of some other codification conventions add further elements 
to the definition: e.g. the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations of 21 March 1986 only 
applies to those intergovernmental organizations that have the capacity to conclude treaties. 111 
In each convention, the given definition was only meant for the purposes of the relevant 
convention and not for general application. 
The definition of an international organization is more elaborate in the DARIO than the 
aforementioned treaties: ‘International organizations may include as members, in addition to 
states, other entities’.112 The DARIO definition means that international organizations may 
include as members, e.g. other international organizations.113 
In general the competence of international organizations is delimited to the sovereignty of its 
member states. However, some organizations have supranational competence and features, in 
particular the UN SC resolutions and the EU decision-making processes.114 
The ICJ gave an advisory opinion in WHO v. Egypt.115 The case was regarding the 
interpretation of a WHO resolution to remove a Regional Office of the WHO from Alexandria, 
Egypt. The ICJ submitted that: ‘International organizations are subjects of international law 
and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law, under their constitution or under international agreements that they are 
parties.’116 
 
2.1.4. Legal personality of the UN 
                                                 
109 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 
331; 8 International Legal Materials (1969) 679 
110 The definition is found in similar form in article I(1)(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of 
States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character of 14 March 1975 
(A/CONF.67/16.), Extract from Volume II of the Official Records of the UN Conference on the Representation 
of  States in Their Relations with International Organizations (Documents of the Conference), article 2(1)(n) of 
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties of 23 August 1978 (United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1946, p. 3.), and article 2(1)(i) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International Organizations of 21 March 1986 
(A/CONF.129/15). 
111 See article 1 (1) (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character of 14 March 1975, A/CONF.67/16, art. 2 (1) (n) of the 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties of 23 August 1978, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1946, p. 3; and article 2 (1) (i) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations of 21 March 1986, A/CONF.129/15. 
See article 6 of the Convention (ibid.). As the Commission noted with regard to the corresponding draft articles: 
“Either an international organization has the capacity to conclude at least one treaty, in which case the rules in 
the draft articles will be applicable to it, or, despite its title, it does not have that capacity, in which case it is 
pointless to state explicitly that the draft articles do not apply to it.” Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part Two), p. 
124. 
112 Article 2 (a) of DARIO. 
113 DARIO commetaries, supra note 8, at 8, para (5). 
114 Hakapää (2010), supra note 21, at 133. 
115 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1980, p. 73. 
116 Ibid. at 89-90, para. 37.  
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The UN has a legal personality in the territory of its member states, under article 104 of the 
UN Charter. The international legal personality of the UN was recognized by the above quoted 
advisory opinion of the Reparations for injuries case117. 
The Reparations for Injuries case118 dealt with two main question regarding the legal 
competence of the UN; first whether the UN has the capacity, in the circumstances where a 
UN agent has suffered injury involving the responsibility of a state, and secondly, if the UN 
has such capacity, how does it relate to the rights of the state whose national the injured agent 
was.119  The ICJ gave an advisory opinion where it found that, even though the answer cannot 
be found exactly from Article 104 of the UN Charter, the tasks, rights and obligations afforded 
to the organization mean such legal personality that includes the competence to make claims 
against states.120 In the key passage of the opinion the ICJ formulated as follows: 
‘In the opinion of the Court, the [UN] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact 
exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the 
possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could 
not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must 
be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant 
duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those 
functions to be effectively discharged. 
Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international 
person.’121  
The UN has been afforded specific features that are unprecedented and unlikely applicable to 
any other organization.122 Many of its powers can be exceeding those of states and other 
international organizations acting superior to them.123 According to article 1 of the UN Charter, 
one of the organization’s primary purposes is to foster international cooperation in solving 
humanitarian problems. UN Secretariat and specialized agencies have particular mandates in 
this field, through resolutions of the GA or a special treaty. 
The UN Charter established six principal organs of the UN: the GA, the SC the Economic and 
Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the ICJ, and the Secretariat. In addition the UN 
includes 15 agencies and several programmes (e.g. the UNHCR) and bodies. The UN and its 
Specialized Agencies (SA) have a specified legal personality under the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the UN (hereinafter CPIUN) and the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the SAs (hereinafter CPIUNSA).124  
                                                 
117 Reparations for injuries (1949), supra note 79. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. at 5. 
120 Hakapää, 2010, supra note 21, at 114. 
121 Reparations for injuries (1949), supra note 79, at 179. 
122 First report on the responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 9, para. 16. 
123 DARIO commentaries, supra note 8, at 104. 
124 The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations New York, 13 February 1946, 
UNTS, vol. 1, p. 15, and vol. 90, p. 327 (corrigendum to vol. 1). The Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies New York, 21 November 1947, UNTS, vol. 33, p. 261. 
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SAs are autonomous intergovernmental organizations that have been created through an 
independent legal instrument and are normally mandated to address a specific issue, need or 
function. SAs are linked to the UN through the UN Charter whereby member states have 
pledged themselves to ‘joint and separate cooperation’ on social and economic issues including 
those related to standards of living, economic and social progress, health, human rights, culture 
and education.125 
UN Programmes are considered subsidiary organs of the GA under Article 22 of the UN 
Charter. Many of the Programmes have limited legal personality as necessary to carry out their 
work and operational independence. Decisions taken by UN Programmes and other subsidiary 
organs do not become effective until they have been reviewed and adopted by the UNGA. 
Many UN subsidiary organs have secretariats to implement the work of the organ.126 UN 
Peacekeeping and political missions are a subsidiary body of the SC.127  
 
 
2.1.5. Development of international organizations as institutions: state-like functions 
 
Although international organizations have a recognized legal personality comparable to states, 
they are considered different from states also in other respects than the principle of speciality. 
Even though the governmental functions were recognized as a critical feature in defining an 
international organization for the purposes of the DARIO128, the exercise of certain state-like 
functions are not commonly associated with international organizations. 
The DARIO do not cover attribution as expressed in articles 9 and 10 of ARSIWA, because 
these articles handle exercise of governmental authority and indicate control over a territory, 
which international organizations are not generally considered to possess.129 The articles deal 
with absence of default of official authorities and conduct of an insurrectional or other 
movement, and are considered ‘unlikely’ according to the ILC, because they presume control 
over a territory by the entity to which the conduct can be attributed.130  
International organizations do not often have control over a territory, although, the UN SC 
authorized ‘the Secretary-General (SG), with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo [...]’.131 International governance by international 
organizations over territories does exist and their governance contains significant 
governmental powers that have effects on the human rights of individuals in those territories 
                                                 
125 Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, supra note 11. 
126 UN Specialized Agencies versus United Nations Programmes -Note by the Executive Director, The 
Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives on Broader International Environmental 
Governance Reform, UNEP 7 June 2010. (available: 
http://www.rona.unep.org/documents/partnerships/IEG/UN_Specialised_Agencies_Vs_UN_Programmes.pdf 
(10.11.2014). 
127 http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN%20system%20chart_lettercolor_2013.pdf (29.1.2015) 
128 First report on the responsibility of international organizations (2003), supra note 45, at 15, paras 26-27. 
129 ARSIWA commentaries, supra note 9, at 49–50. See also DARIO commentaries, supra note 8, at 86. 
130 Second report on responsibility of international organizations by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, ILC 
Fifty-fifth session, Geneva, 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004, A/CN.4/541, Geneva (2004), at 29, para. 
67. 
131 SC Res. 1244 (1999), supra note 1. 
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and therefore should be addressed more thoroughly in regards to the responsibility of 
international organizations.  
Another example of ‘territorial legislation’ as Paul C. Szasz put it, is Regulation No. 4132 in 
exception to the Headquarters Agreement concluded in 1947 between the United Nations and 
the United States.133 According to the regulation the UN limited its liability on damages 
regarding any tort action against the organization or persons acting on its behalf. From the 
perspective of international law, Szasz submits that the Regulation 4. does not rely on the 
immunity of the UN, but rather is ‘an exercise in legislation, establishing a particular tort 
regime’ under its jurisdiction on the territory of the UN headquarters.134 
The exercise of state-like functions by international organizations, especially for the UN, does 
seem to exist in practice much more than is formally recognized. States are reluctant to 
recognize that an international organization may hold power over their territory, or threaten 
their governmental hegemony, but that actually leads to a more severe responsibility of the 
states for breaches that should be attributed to the international organization. Further, the lack 
of recognition of governance of international organizations, in situations where the state is not 
the primary provider of legal protection to individuals in its jurisdiction, have lead to situations 
of no accountability of any kind, as was demonstrated in the Behrami-Saramati cases.135  
In the commentaries to DARIO, however, it is submitted that the responsibility of international 
organizations should be looked at broadly and in practice the rules of Articles 9-10 ARSIWA 
may be applied to international organizations.136 
  
                                                 
132 UN Doc. A/41/PV.101, at 26 (1986). GA Resolution 41/210 (Dec. 11, 1986). 
133 Agreement between the UN and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United 
Nations, June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416, TIAS No. 1676, 11 UNTS 11. Section 7(b) specifies that ‘except 
otherwise provided…the federal, state and local laws of the [US] shall apply within the headquarters district.’ 
Under Section 8 the UN may make such ‘otherwise’ regulations operative within the headquarters district.  
134 Paul C. Szasz, The United Nations Legislates to Limit its Liability, 81 American Journal of International 
Law, No. 3 (July 1987), 739-744. 
135 App. No. 71412/01 Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France, and App. No. 78166/01 Ruzhdi Saramati v. 
France, Germany and Norway, Grand Chamber decision of 2 May 2007 (hereinafter Behrami-Saramati). See 
also Marko Milanovic and Tatjana Papic, As Bad As It Gets: The European Court Of Human Rights's Behrami 
And Saramati Decision And General International Law, 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
2009, 267-296. 
136 DARIO commentaries, supra note 8, at 16-17. See also Documents of the twenty-seventh session including 
the report of the Commission to the General Assembly, A/CN.4/SER.A/1975/Add.l, YILC 1975, vol. II, 
document A/10010/Rev.1, chap. II.B.2, para. (12) of the commentary to proposed article 13 on the ARSIWA, at 
90, when an organ of an international organization acts on the territory of a state:  ‘the conduct of organs of an 
international organization acting in that capacity is not attributable to a State by reason only of the fact that such 
conduct has taken place in the territory of the State in question or in some other territory under its jurisdiction’. 
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2.2. ‘Rules of the organization’ - lex specialis challenging the DARIO 
 
2.2.1 Rules of the organization as internal laws of international organizations 
 
Rules of the organization that govern international organizations are ‘in particular, the 
constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of the international organization 
adopted in accordance with those instruments, and established practice of the organization’.137 
In other words, rules of the organization include the constituent instrument of the organization 
and the rules flowing from it.  
Rules of the organization are considered to be the equivalent to national, internal laws of 
states.138 They determine the organs and agents and other entities whose conduct may be 
attributed to an international organization. Similarly as the equivalent provision regarding state 
responsibility.139 However, equating internal laws of states and rules of international 
organizations is problematic; the responsibility of states is unaffected by internal laws of a 
state, while the rules of the organization of international organizations are part of international 
law due to their treaty origin. Internal laws of states are national laws that are considered 
inferior to international laws and may not affect their application. Although they are significant 
in determining the organs of a state regarding attribution, international law provides the rules 
for interpreting internal laws of a state. Rules of the organization are different, because 
regarding intergovernmental organizations, they are international treaty law, primary sources 
that may be interpreted as special rules, lex specialis, overriding the general provisions and 
principles of the DARIO in a way that internal laws of states may not, relating to the 
international responsibility of states. 
The ILC has submitted regarding the terminology used of the laws of an international 
organization as rules of the organization: ‘there would be problems in referring to the “internal 
law” of an organization, for while it has an internal aspect, this law has in other respects an 
international aspect.’140 
For years there have been debates about the sui generis nature of international organizations.141 
International organizations are not equipped with ‘the totality of international rights and duties 
recognized by international law’142 as states and during the drafting of the DARIO, most 
international organizations took the position that the founding premise should be speciality not 
generality when applying international legal framework to them and found the lex specialis 
article to be a key provision to express that.143 The UN commented that the ILC ‘should be 
                                                 
137 Article 2 (b) of DARIO. 
138 Second report on responsibility of international organizations (2004), supra note 130, at 10-11, para. 20. 
139 Article 3 of ARSIWA: The characterization of an act of a state as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law. 
140 YILC 1982, vol. II, Part Two, Report of the Commission to the GA on the work of the thirty-fourth session 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.l (Part 2), at 21, Question of treaties concluded between states and international 
organizations or between two or more international organizations. 
141 Kristen E. Boon, The Role of Lex Specialis in the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.) Responsibility of International Organizations, Essays in Memory of 
Sir Ian Brownlie (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2013), 135-147, at 135. 
142 Reparation for injuries (1949), supra note 79, at 180. 
143 Boon, Lex Specialis in the DARIO (2013), supra note 141, at 135-136. 
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guided by the specificities of the various international organizations: their organizational 
structure, the nature and composition of their governing organs, and their regulations, rules and 
special procedures—in brief, their special character’.144  
The rules regarding lex specialis echo the concept of speciality in international law.145 Rules 
of the organization are special and different to each organization and that limits their 
competence, but also their exposure to the scope of claims regarding responsibility.146 The 
principle of speciality was recognized by the ICJ, in the advisory opinion on the Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons: 
The Court need hardly point out that international organizations are subjects of international 
law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence. International organizations are 
governed by the "principle of speciality", that is to say, they are invested by the states which 
create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose 
promotion those states entrust to them.147 
Article 32 of DARIO states that an international organization may not rely on its internal rules 
as a justification for non-compliance with its obligations under international law. Internal rules 
may, however, influence the rules of responsibility, e.g. in relation to agreements on attribution 
of conduct between the international organization and its members.148 The ILC has discussed 
this problematic dynamic in a confusing way itself:  
‘The internal law of an international organization cannot be sharply differentiated from 
international law. At least the constituent instrument of the international organization is a treaty 
or another instrument governed by international law; some further parts of the internal law of 
the organization may be viewed as belonging to international law… On the other hand, with 
regard to non-member states, Article 103 of the UN Charter may provide a justification for the 
organization’s conduct in breach of an obligation under a treaty with a non-member state. Thus, 
the relations between international law and the internal law of an international organization 
appear too complex to be expressed in a general principle.’149 
Professor Maurizio Arcari has put it well by submitting that: 
‘state responsibility and the responsibility of international organizations may appear as parallel 
worlds, where parallel problems invite the search for parallel solutions. However, in the legal 
field the transposition of identical clauses from one ambit to another does not necessarily 
guarantee coherent legal effects. In this case […] very different and unintended legal 
consequences may develop in the parallel worlds of international responsibility.’150  
Although the ILC has followed the structure and contents of the ARSIWA well while drafting 
the DARIO, even the seemingly parallel provisions seem lead to strikingly different 
                                                 
144 Responsibility of international organizations. Comments and observations received from international 
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145 Boon, Lex Specialis in the DARIO (2013), supra note 141, at 140. 
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interpretations and difficulties. Are there enough common denominators to provide general 
rules on the responsibilities of international organizations and to what extent is it possible? 
Professor Brölmann discusses the ‘semi-closed’ nature of international organizations, saying 
that the autonomous status of the internal laws of international organizations have two-fold 
effects; on the one hand the internal rules and laws of an international organizations do not 
have a normative force in general international law, but on the other hand general international 
law may not automatically have normative force within the legal order of the international 
organization.151 This makes a barrier for general international law, such as the law of 
responsibility from operating inside international institutions.152 To summarize the problem of 
lex specialis: there seems to be no general rule of responsibility that can override institutional 
law of international organizations.153 
 
 
2.2.2. Lex specialis nature of the rules of the organization 
 
According to lex specialis, if a general standard as well as a more specific rule is regulating a 
matter, the latter should take precedence over the former. The principle that special law 
derogates from general law is widely accepted adage in legal interpretation and resolving 
normative conflicts.154 The relationship between the general rule (lege generali) and the special 
rule (lex specialis) can be approached on the one hand from a view that the special rule should 
be within the confines or background of the general rule, elaborating or specifying the latter, 
with both rules ultimately pointing in the same direction.155 On the other hand lex specialis can 
be seen as hierarchically unrelated to the general rule, pointing to a different direction, where 
the special rule is seen as more suitable.156  
Distinguishing the general and the special is often hard depending on the point of observation; 
conclusions may be different whether one is looking at the substance of the norm or the legal 
subjects to whom it is addressed.157 It may be determined that one of several rules prevail or it 
could be resolved that they may coexist.158 Further, lex specialis has an unclear relationship to 
other maxims of interpretation and resolving norm conflicts, e.g. the principle lex posterior 
derogat legi priori.159 One interpretation gives priority to the rule that is later in time over the 
special rule.160 
                                                 
151 Brölmann, the Institutional veil of international law (2007), supra note 89, at 254. 
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155 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the ILC Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi A/CN.4/L.682, 13 
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Article 64 of DARIO expresses the lex specialis rule in relation to the lege generali, the 
provisions of DARIO: 
‘These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility 
of an international organization, or a State in connection with the conduct of an international 
organization, are governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of 
international law may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the relations 
between an international organization and its members.’ 
The ‘special rules’ mean the constituent instruments and other rules and principles deriving 
from it and they may contain important provisions also resulting as lex specialis overriding the 
DARIO.161 The ICJ submitted in the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons case that: 
[...] the constituent instruments of international organizations are also treaties of a particular 
type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which 
the parties entrust the task of realizing common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems 
of interpretation owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the same time 
institutional; the very nature of the organization created, the objectives which have been 
assigned to it by its founders, the imperatives associated with the effective performance of its 
functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements which may deserve special attention 
when the time comes to interpret those constituent treaties.’162 
The ICJ reiterated that the constituent instrument of an international organization has to be 
interpreted ‘in the light of [...] the practice followed by the Organization’.163 The ‘established 
practice’ of an international organization is strongly emphasized in the DARIO.164 According 
to the ILC the emphasis of practice brings a balance between the constituent instrument of 
international organizations and its needs to develop as an institution.165 Practice is an important 
element in interpreting the constituent instruments of international organizations. In Legal 
consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the ICJ, interpreted the UN 
Charter in light of practice of the SC and held that the constituent instrument has to be 
interpreted in the light of the practice followed by the organization.166 According to Special 
Rapporteur Gaja, related to attribution of conduct a wider interpretation should not be accepted 
and when the practice of an organization develops in a manner that is inconsistent with its 
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constituent instrument, and the organization may not be exempt from responsibility where a 
conduct goes beyond the scope of the organization’s competence.167 
Although it seems, the lex specialis provision gives a very wide margin of applying the rules 
of the organization to the detriment of general provisions of international law, international 
organizations cannot justify non-compliance with their international obligations or escape 
responsibility based on rules of the organization as expressed in article 32 of DARIO.168  The 
ICJ has submitted in the Reparations for injuries case that ‘There is nothing in the character of 
international organizations to justify their being considered as some form of “super-State”’169. 
International organizations are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general 
rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which 
they are parties.  
The concept of lex specialis should not allow international organizations to disregard general 
rules of international law and the thresholds of specificity and genuine inconsistency must be 
fulfilled. Nonetheless, there remains significant opacity in the approach to lex specialis in the 
DARIO.170 The ILC has recognized that the concept of lex specialis cannot be codified, 
especially due to its dependence on the normative context, which changes from one 
international organization to another and depends on the circumstances at hand.171  
Relating to the responsibility of international organizations, where states or international 
organizations have agreed upon otherwise or responsibility has been addressed elsewhere in 
certain contexts, those special rules will be applied instead over the general provisions of the 
DARIO.172 According to Professor of law Kristen E. Boon, the lex specialis provision and some 
other provisions of the DARIO, emphasize the role of the rules of the organization and lex 
specialis while the DARIO is left in a ‘residual’ role.173 In practice the lex specialis in relation 
to the DARIO means that, if the DARIO provisions are in conflict with a treaty, the treaty 
prevails.174 There may also be instances where also non-treaty standards are at odds with the 
DARIO and the lack of a binding instrument does not mean the clash could not be fundamental 
with the DARIO provisions.175   
According to Boon, in order to make a case for lex specialis over the DARIO, four criteria 
must be fulfilled: there must be an actual inconsistency between the rules; one body of law has 
to be more specific than the other; the sources of law leading to the conflict support the 
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application of lex specialis; and the application of lex specialis does not alter the rights or 
obligations of the beneficiaries of the agreement.176  
The lex specialis principle comes down to interpretation and in order to apply, the 
inconsistency must be an actual one between the colliding norms or there has to be an intention 
that one provision is to exclude the other. In the Neumeister177 case, the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) held that the specific obligation for compensation of article 
5, paragraph 5, of the European Convention of human rights (hereinafter ECHR) for unlawful 
arrest or detention did not prevail over the more general provision for compensation in Article 
50, because the application of the lex specialis principle to article 5, paragraph 5, would have 
led to ‘consequences incompatible with the aim and object of the [ECHR]’.178 The ECtHR 
considered it was sufficient that the specific provision was taken into account when applying 
the general rule. 
The rules of the organization and the way in which they are interpreted are important, because 
the answer to whether a certain conduct is attributable to an international organization is 
deduced from the rules of the organization. It may be necessary to establish whether an entity 
is an organ or an agent of the international organization to which a certain conduct may be 
attributed.179 In relation to the responsibility of the UN, the rules of the organization and 
agreements between its members, may affect the applicability of the general attribution rules. 
Related to the principles regarding the rules of the organization and lex specialis, the UN has 
its own provision in the DARIO, according to which, the UN Charter prevails over the DARIO. 
 
 
2.2.3. The Charter of the United Nations as lex specialis to the DARIO  
 
Article 67 of the DARIO expresses a lex specialis rule regarding the UN stating that ‘these 
draft articles are without prejudice to the [UN Charter].’ According to the commentaries, ‘the 
reference to the Charter includes obligations that are directly stated in the Charter as well as 
those flowing from binding decisions of the SC which according to the ICJ similarly prevail 
over other obligations under international law on the basis of article 103 of the UN Charter’.180 
Article 103 of the UN Charter stipulates that ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail.’ 
Article 59 of ARSIWA includes a similar provision. According to the commentaries the article 
103 of the UN Charter gains importance in situations where decisions made by political organs 
of the UN may affect state responsibility and cause conflicts between obligations that arise 
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from the UN Charter and other international treaty obligations. In the Lockerbie cases,181 for 
example, it appears that the UN Charter was interpreted to being hierarchically superior to the 
ARSIWA.182 Libya filed proceedings in the ICJ in 1992 against the United States (US) 
regarding a dispute over the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention183 arising 
from the aerial incident over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. 
The ILC found that there was no reason to question a similar provision regarding international 
organizations, even though international organizations are not members of the UN and not 
legally bound by the UN Charter.184 The ILC went on to use an example of an arms embargo 
where the UN SC resolutions are binding on international organizations as well as states and 
considered it not the purpose of the DARIO to determine the extent to which the responsibility 
of international organizations is affected.185 The DARIO seem to portray an approach where 
the collective security measure of the UN Charter regime have been left out of the scope of the 
DARIO, which could mean that they are seen as separate and complementary or a parallel 
regime in relation to the DARIO.186 
The UN Secretariat made observations during the drafting of the articles on the responsibility 
of international organizations, where it stated that:  
Unlike other organizations, however, which . . . may not rely on their rules as a justification for 
failure to comply with their international obligations, the UN could invoke the Charter … and 
SC resolutions—to the extent that they reflect an international law obligation—to justify what 
might otherwise be regarded as non-compliance.187 
According to this reasoning, the UN Charter obligations and related SC resolutions have a 
‘quasi-constitutional’ status and should be granted supremacy in the international legal 
system.188 The UN Secretariat went as far as suggesting that the DARIO commentaries should 
include a statement that the DARIO have to be interpreted in conformity with the UN 
Charter.189 According to Arcari, the interpretations go beyond the scope and effects of the UN 
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Charter 103 and the non-prejudice clause could render the DARIO completely irrelevant in any 
case related to the responsibility of the UN and, especially when acting through the SC.190 
Altough the commentaries to Article 67 of the DARIO finish of by stating that ‘the present 
article is not intended to exclude the applicability of the principles and rules set forth in the 
preceding articles to the international responsibility of the UN.’ Considering the extensive 
interpretations the article may have, the effect of it could end up irreconcilable in relation the 
DARIO.191 
There is case law that have challenged the superiority of the UN SC resolutions, such as the 
Kadi cases192 before the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) and the Nada case193 
before the ECtHR.194 In both cases individuals were listed by the Sanctions Committee of the 
UN SC, which was established by resolution 1267 (1999), with the power to identify 
individuals and entities that were suspected of involvement with the Taliban and Al Qaida. The 
individuals were not awarded recourse to any independent judicial process to challenge their 
listings. Both decisions gave preference to human rights standards over UN SC sanctions 
stemming from the resolution 1267 (1999) sanctions regime.  
The Al-Jedda case195 before the ECtHR addressed a norm conflict between the European 
Convention on Human Rights196 (ECHR) and UNSC resolution 1546197 and the role of Article 
103 of the UN Charter. In the case the British Forces in Iraq detained the applicant under the 
authority of the UN SC Resolution 1546. The ECtHR held as follows: 
In its approach to the interpretation of Resolution 1546, the Court has reference to the 
considerations set out in paragraph 76 above. In addition, the Court must have regard to the 
purposes for which the UN was created. As well as the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 1 of the UN Charter, the third 
subparagraph provides that the United Nations was established to “achieve international 
cooperation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. Article 24(2) of the Charter requires the SC, in discharging its duties with respect 
to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to “act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the UN”. Against this background, the Court 
considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the SC does not 
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intend to impose any obligation on member states to breach fundamental principles of human 
rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a SC Resolution, the Court must therefore 
choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention 
and which avoids any conflict of obligations. In the light of the UNs’ important role in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit 
language would be used were the SC to intend states to take particular measures which would 
conflict with their obligations under international human rights law.198 
Article 5 of ECHR was considered to apply and Mr. Al-Jedda’s detention was deemed 
unlawful.199 Even though the letters annexed to the resolution expressly referred to security 
internment,200 the ECtHR found that the resolution expressly referred to the need to comply 
with international human rights law. Furthermore, the UN SG and his special representative in 
Iraq frequently objected to the use of internment.201 The ECtHR however, did not address the 
issue of whether authorizations are capable of being covered by Article 103.202 According to 
Professor Marko Milanovic, the Al-Jedda case is an important development, where the ECtHR 
has made a clear statement rule for interpreting SC resolutions that can go a long way in 
providing a meaningful human rights check on the UN SC.203  
Even though the ILC makes reference to its earlier text and has adopted a very specific 
definition of the rules of the organization, it does not resolve the inconsistencies that result 
from the dual nature of the rules of the organization as rules international law and internal rules 
for the purposes of specifying hierarchies and competences within the international 
organization. There is an unavoidable clash between rules of the organization in developing as 
lex specialis on the one hand and the calls for end to impunity and general accountability on 
the other. An application of rules of the organization should not be allowed to lead to lack of 
accountability. 
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2.3. Attribution of conduct as an element of responsibility 
 
2.3.1. General 
 
As the international legal personality of international organizations is consolidated in 
international law, it is essential to determine the juridical regime of their international 
responsibility in order to determine their obligations and to avoid breaches.204 The elements of 
an internationally wrongful act of an international organization are set out in Article 4 of the 
DARIO: 
There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: 
(a) is attributable to that organization under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organization. 
The international obligation that is breached is determined by the primary rules, treaty or other 
source of international law that are binding on the international organization. The following 
sections are focused on the first element, rules regarding the attribution of conduct to 
international organizations. As stated in Article 4 of the DARIO, the conduct may be action or 
omission. The DARIO set out the positive criteria for attribution of conduct and do not express 
when conduct may not be attributed to an international organization. 
Attribution of conduct is a distinct concept from the breach of an obligation and says nothing 
on the legality or illegality of a certain conduct. The content of the responsibility depends 
ultimately on the obligation alleged to have been breached (primary rule) and on the 
circumstances at hand. In practice there is often a close link between the attribution of conduct 
and the obligation that is alleged to have been breached.205  
Attribution of conduct is separate from attribution of responsibility, which is often the approach 
in practice. Attribution of conduct is not necessarily implied as opposed to in e.g. Article 5 of 
Annex IX to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea206, which represents 
attribution of responsibility. The Article states that international organizations and their 
member states are required to declare their respective competence with regard to matters 
covered by the Convention. In article 6 it is submitted that ‘Parties which have competence 
under article 5 […] shall have responsibility for failure to comply with obligations or for any 
other violation of this Convention. 207  
The draft articles on the attribution of conduct to an international organization are modelled 
from the attribution rules adopted in the ARSIWA (Articles 4-11). While the ARSIWA are not 
directly pertinent in relation to international organizations, the responsibility of states was 
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taken fully into account in the drafting of the DARIO, when the attribution rules and wording 
in relevant articles are similar.  
In order for a conduct to be attributed to an international organization, it has to be performed 
by an organ or agent of the international organization. Secondly, a conduct that is performed 
by organ of a state or an organ or agent of another international organization, which is placed 
at the disposal of an international organization, may be attributed to the organization, if it 
retained sufficient level of control over the conduct. Finally, it is submitted that a certain 
conduct may be attributed to more than one entity by dual attribution. 
As discussed above, the nature of rules of the organization as part of international law, with 
the lex specialis provisions of the DARIO, bring certain complications to applying the general 
rules of the DARIO to international organizations, which is especially prevalent regarding 
attribution of conduct. Further, there is la shortage of consistent practice or jurisprudence 
regarding the attribution of conduct to international organizations. 
 
2.3.2. Organs and agents of an international organization: the functional link 
 
In order for a certain conduct to be attributable to an international organization, it has to be 
performed by certain entities connected to the international organization, in most cases its 
‘organs’ or ‘agents’. The rules of attribution are mostly determined by rules of the organization. 
Accordingly Article 6 of DARIO is as follows:  
‘1. The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of 
functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organization under 
international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization.  
2. The rules of the organization apply in the determination of the functions of its organs and 
agents.’ 
According to Article 6 of the DARIO the organ or agent of an international organization 
conduct is attributable to an international organization ‘in the performance of functions of that 
organ or agent’ meaning functions that have been given to that organ or agent. When the organ 
or agent acts in a private capacity, the conduct is not attributed to the organization.208 Article 7 
of DARIO does not specify what type of acts may be attributable and covers a wider scope of 
actions than the corresponding Article 5 of ARSIWA, which is limited to the exercise of 
‘governmental authority’.209With international organizations the ‘exercise of governmental 
authority’ does not apply in general and the scope of acts that are attributable to an international 
organization, are any of its acts with unlimited description.  
The attribution of conduct to an international organization differs from the principles regarding 
states also in respect of the entities whose conduct is attributable to the international 
organization.210 The notion of organs and agents widens the scope of the rule from that 
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concerning states, when the ARSIWA makes provision only on organs of the state. 211 An 
individual with no official status within the international organization who carries out conduct 
upon its direction and control will be regarded as its agent and the conduct will be attributable 
to the organization on that basis.212  
In relation to state responsibility, international law follows the principle of unity of the state 
according to which the acts or omissions of all state organs should be regarded as acts or 
omissions of the state for the purposes of international responsibility.213 The ICJ has affirmed 
the rule in Immunity from Legal Process of a Special: ‘According to a well-established rule of 
international law, the conduct of any organ of a state must be regarded as an act of that state. 
This rule … is of a customary character.’214 Although the internal laws of a state, have an 
important role in attribution of conduct, the status and functions of state representatives, 
officials and other entities as organs, may not be determined only by internal law, but through 
practice as well.215 With regards to the rules of the organization (above section), the rules of 
international organizations include their established practice, which allows for them to develop 
as an institution.216 The established practice of international organizations has influence in 
attribution of conduct. 
Similarly as with states, while the rules of the organization are significant in classifying a 
certain entity as an organ or agent of an international organization, they alone may not provide 
the answer.217 In the Reparations for injuries case the ICJ found that, while the UN Charter 
only mentions ‘organs’ as entities of the organization, ‘agents’  that have been conferred 
functions by an organ of the UN are considered attributable to the UN: 
‘The Court understands the word ‘agent’ in the most liberal sense, that is to say, any person 
who, whether a paid official or not, and whether permanently employed or not, has been 
charged by an organ of the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its 
functions —in short, any person through whom it acts.’218 
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In general, most international organizations usually act through their various organs and agents, 
it can be considered a rule that acts and omissions by any of those organs in the exercise of 
their competences, may be attributed to the organization.219  
In Applicability the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the UN220 case before the 
ICJ, the UN Economic and Social Council (hereinafter ECOSOC) requested the ICJ to give an 
opinion on the applicability of the aforementioned convention to Mr. Dumitru Mazilu as 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. The ICJ gave value to the practice of the UN where persons, who did not have 
official status of UN officials, had been entrusted missions and that their administrative 
position does not provide the answer of their status with UN, but ‘the nature of their mission’  
is of the essence.221 
The ICJ has submitted, In relation to damages incurred resulting from acts or omissions by the 
UN, that the conduct of the UN includes acts and omissions of its officials and ‘agents’, apart 
from its primary and subsidiary organs.222 This means not only officials of the UN, but also 
persons who are acting for the organization based on functions granted by an organ of the 
UN.223 Legal scholars have agreed that a functional link between the agent and the organization 
would premise attribution of conduct to the organization. The functional link is usually 
established on the basis of the constituent instrument of the organization.224 
The general rule of attribution of conduct as set out in Article 6 provides a seemingly clear 
basis for attribution. However, often times with international organizations, there is multiple 
and multilateral co-operation with other international organizations and with states, which all 
act under different mandates and retained by special agreements. UN peacekeeping is a good 
example of a situation, where the general clear-cut rule of Article 6 of DARIO, does not apply. 
UN Peacekeeping fall under the scope of Article 7 of DARIO. 
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2.3.3. Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of an international organization 
 
2.3.3.1. General 
 
Article 7 of DARIO deals with attribution of conduct of organs of a state or organs or agents 
of an international organization that are placed at the disposal of another international 
organization: 
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is 
placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under 
international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control 
over that conduct.’ 
While Article 6 deals with situations where an entity is fully seconded to an organization, 
Article 7 applies to cases where a seconded entity still acts ‘to a certain extent’ as an organ or 
agent of the sending state or organization.225 Article 7 stipulates that the international 
organization at which disposal an organ or an agent has been placed is only responsible for 
their conduct if they had ‘effective control’ over the conduct, in an effort to stipulate on the 
boundaries between different acting entities. 
Questions of attribution of conduct have been debated especially in situations relating to Article 
7 of DARIO. The problem lies with distinguishing whether a certain conduct should be 
attributed to the international organization itself or to the state or international organization that 
has placed organs or agents at its disposal. The rules of the organization, the agreements made 
between the international organization and the state or international organization providing 
assistance and the established practice between the parties, provide tools in determining to 
which a certain conduct may be attributed.  Article 7 of DARIO does not resolve whether a 
certain conduct is attributed to a state or an international organization at all, but rather resolve 
to which entity certain conduct has to be attributed.226  
Article 7 of DARIO originates from Articles 6 and 8 of ARSIWA. According to the ARSIWA, 
the acts need to be performed in the ‘exercise of governmental authority’227, whereas Article 7 
of DARIO applies to any acts and the scope of Article 7 of DARIO is wider than the 
corresponding provisions of the ARSIWA. Any act committed by an organ of a state or an 
organ or agent of an international organization that has been placed at the disposal of an 
international organization, may be attributed to the receiving organization, if the organization 
has ‘effective control’ over such conduct.228 
The state or an international organization may conclude an agreement with the receiving 
international organization over the placement of an organ or agent at the latter organization’s 
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disposal. The agreement may state which state or organization would be responsible for the 
conduct of the seconded organ or agent.229 UN peacekeeping operations are usually arranged 
with agreements between the UN and the member state providing troops. Most of the practice 
that was referred to during the drafting of the Article 7 of DARIO deals with UN 
peacekeeping.230 
UN peacekeeping forces are regarded as subsidiary organs of the UN, but peacekeeping forces 
can consist of UN staff, volunteers, independent contractors and members of national armed 
forces and therefore the question of attribution of conduct is not clear-cut.231 Peacekeeping 
operations consist of military, police and civilian personnel in an effort to ‘maintain peace and 
security, … facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, 
protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law..’232  
Originally, UN military operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were supposed to be 
under complete UN control. It was envisaged that member states would provide their armed 
forces to the SC, but member states were unwilling to make the arrangements.233 In the current 
model, the SC authorizes willing member states to engage in military action in UN operations, 
where the SC finds it necessary for international peace and security.  
Peacekeeping operations are divided into UN-led operations and UN-authorized operations, 
due to different ways in which the command and control is administered in the operations. In 
the case of the former, armed military peacekeepers of member states are put at the disposal of 
the UN and deployed as a contingent to a UN peacekeeping operation, which has the legal 
status of a subsidiary organ of the SC.234 The military members are under the ‘operational 
control’ of the UN Force Commander, while a contingent commander, commands these forces, 
In UN-authorized peace operations, authorized by the SC, the UN has a limited formal 
involvement in the day-to-day management of the operation. In such operations, the SG’s role 
is restricted to acting as the conduit by which the multinational force reports to the SC.235 In 
such operations, the UN has no command or control over the military peacekeepers.236 
Command and control would generally lie with a particular state or international organization, 
other than the UN.237 
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According to the model contribution agreement relating to military contingents placed at the 
disposal of the UN by one of its member states in peace operations, the UN is regarded as liable 
towards third parties, but has a right of recovery from the contributing state under 
circumstances such as ‘loss, damage, death or injury [arising] from gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct of the personnel provided by the government’.238 The agreement is not conclusive 
because it governs the relations between the contributing state or organization and the receiving 
organization and may thus not deprive a third party of any right that the party may have towards 
the state or organization which is responsible under the general rules.239 Arrangements that are 
concluded between the UN and the contributing state only concern the parties and do not affect 
the question of attribution of conduct under general international law.240 
In practice, depending on the nature of claims, the UN has acknowledged its responsibility for 
the conduct of national contingents many times and concluded many agreements with states.241 
The first time UN resumed responsibility, was in 1965 when the SG settled claims with 
Belgium and some other states for damages suffered by the state nationals in the Congo 
resulting of harmful acts of United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)242 personnel. The 
agreement stated: ‘The UN has stated that it would not evade responsibility where it was 
established that UN agents had in fact caused unjustifiable damage to innocent parties.’243 No 
provisions have been made in any of the agreements that would indicate that the state 
contingents would be held responsible.244 Further, the position taken by the UN has been 
reasserted repeatedly over the years.245 The conduct of the UN is also attributed to the 
organization with regards to responsibility under international law.246 
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Regarding private law claims the UN has asserted many times, that it does not evade 
responsibility where UN agents have in fact caused unjustifiable damage to innocent parties.  
With regard to an accident that occurred to a British helicopter that had been put in Cyprus at 
the disposal of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP), the Office of 
Legal Affairs stated: 
‘The crew members of the helicopters are members of the British contingent of UNFICYP and 
the helicopter flights take place in the context of the operations of UNFICYP. Through the 
chain of command, the operations in which the helicopters are involved take place under the 
ultimate authority of the UNFICYP Force Commander and are the responsibility of the UN. 
The circumstances under which the British-owned helicopters are put at the disposal of 
UNFICYP thus lead to the conclusion that these helicopters should be considered as United 
Nations aircraft. As the carrier, it is the UN that could and normally would be held liable by 
third parties in case of accidents involving UNFICYP helicopters and causing damages or 
injuries to these parties; therefore third-party claims should normally be expected to be 
addressed to the UN.’247 
However, in agreements between the UN and states regarding peacekeeping it is usually 
specified that the national state of the troops that are contributed to a UN peacekeeping 
operation, retain control over disciplinary matters and have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
affairs, international or otherwise, and therefore bear the responsibility for such conduct 
involving state personnel.248 According to several legal scholars the decisive factor on 
attribution may not be deduced merely from the agreements, but is decided based on who 
retained the effective control over the conduct.249 Based on this assessment, UN could be held 
accountable also for criminal conduct by national contingents, if they had effective control over 
the conduct.  
The UN Secretariat has submitted that UN peacekeeping operations are subject ‘to the 
executive direction and control of the Secretary-General, under the overall direction of the SC 
or the GA, as the case may be.’250 Therefore, an act of a UN peacekeeping force would always 
be attributable to the UN.251 If committed in violation of an international obligation, such 
conduct would entail ‘the international responsibility of the UN and its liability in 
compensation’. For any such act having been performed by members of a national military 
contingent ‘does not affect the international responsibility of the UN vis-à-vis third states or 
individuals’.252 While the UN apportions responsibility on the basis of whether the conduct of 
the personnel at UN disposal amounts to gross negligence or wilful misconduct, towards third 
states and individuals, the international responsibility and liability of the UN is, in the first 
place, assumed by the UN without prejudice to its ability to seek recovery from the contributing 
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member state concerned.253 Why this practice of compensating third parties is not applied to 
criminal cases, is curious. 
According to the UN Secretariat the principle of attribution for UN operations is premised on 
the assumption that the operation is conducted under UN ‘command and control’ and the 
conduct is, therefore, exclusively attributable to the UN. On the other hand, operations 
authorized under chapter VII of the Charter, conducted under national command and control 
(UN-authorized), the conduct of the operation is attributable to the states exercising command 
and control. Also in joint operations under joint command and control, international 
responsibility lies with who exercises effective command and control. According to Legal 
Officer at the UN Office of Legal Affairs Montejo in non-UN and joint operations, troops are 
not put at the disposal of the UN and do not fall under the purview, of attribution rules of 
Article 7 on the responsibility of international organizations.254 
The effective control test needs to be applied and on a case-by-case basis and according to the 
attribution criteria should be based on factual criteria.255  
 
2.3.3.2. Effective control 
 
The assumption behind Article 7 of DARIO appears to be that, when organs or agents are put 
at the disposal of an international organization, the level of control by the latter over those 
organs and agents is often limited. Hence the need for a factual test over ‘effective control’.256  
The notion of effective control is addressed in the commentaries to Article 8 of ARSIWA 
referencing the Nicaragua case.257 In the case the ICJ had to decide upon whether breaches of 
international humanitarian law that were committed by contras (armed opposition groups) who 
were fighting against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government forces in the 1980s, were attributable 
to the US. The US was funding the contras and acknowledged it officially and made specific 
provisions for submitting funds to US intelligence agencies in order to support the contras. 
Nicaragua alleged that the US had effective control of the contras. The ICJ applied a test of 
‘effective control’ when deciding whether the conduct of the contras should be attributed to the 
US and ended up rejecting the responsibility of the US for the said violations:  
‘Despite the heavy subsidies and other support provided to them by the US, there is no clear 
evidence of the US having actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify 
treating the contras as acting on its behalf […]  
All the forms of US participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the 
respondent state over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves 
mean, without further evidence, that the US directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
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contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant state. Such acts could 
well be committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States. For this 
conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be 
proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the 
course of which the alleged violations were committed.’258 
The Tadić case also relates to Article 8 of ARSIWA involving the conduct of Bosnian Serb 
armed groups acting on behalf of the Federal Republic of Serbia.259  However, the ICTY 
applied a test of ‘overall control’ as opposed to ‘effective control’ . Both cases concerned the 
applicability of certain rules of international humanitarian law and the Nicaragua case dealt 
with attribution of conduct to a state, while the Tadić case handled jurisdictional issues 
regarding the applicability of IHL.260 Duško Tadić was charged with persecution, murder, 
beatings and other offences alleged to have been committed in 1992 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The commentaries to Article 8 of ARSIWA seem more favourable to the ‘effective control’ 
test.261 Article 8 requires that the conduct be the result of acting ‘on the instructions’, ‘under 
the direction’ or ‘control’, of the state that is carrying out the conduct. Whether a conduct may 
be attributed to a State, it is decided on a case-by-case basis.262 However, the ICTY stated that 
the ‘effective control’ standard only applied for the attribution to a state for conduct by single 
private individuals. Judicial decisions, even succeeding Tadić, support the view that whenever 
the conduct of organized armed groups or military units is at stake it is sufficient to show that 
the state to which they may be linked exercises ‘overall control’ over them, in order for the 
conduct of those groups or units to be legally attributed to the state.263 According to Professor 
Antonio Cassese, the Nicaragua test has only been adopted by the ILC and the ICJ and has not 
been adopted by states or courts.264 On the contrary, he finds that state practice speaks rather 
on behalf of the ‘overall control’ test than ‘effective control’. 
The ‘effective control’ test, to the extent that it is also applied to organized armed groups, is 
inconsistent with a basic principle ‘underpinning’ state responsibility, according to which states 
may not evade responsibility towards other states when they, use groups of individuals instead 
of officials, to undertake actions that are intended to damage, or in the event do damage, other 
states.265 States must answer for such actions of those individuals, even if such individuals have 
gone beyond their mandate or what was agreed.266  
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In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber did not reject the Nicaragua test, but applied two rules, the 
Nicaragua test, that it considered to apply to private individuals, and another degree of control 
over actions by organized and hierarchically structured groups, such as military or paramilitary 
units. In this case overall control by the state over the group was adequate, thus specific 
instructions were not required for each individual operation.267 Such ‘overall control’ resided 
not only in equipping, financing or training and providing operational support to the group, but 
also in coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military or paramilitary activity.268  
UN bodies have embraced the ‘overall control’ test.269 
Cassese proposes the ‘overall control’ test to the use of national military contingents by 
international organizations for peacekeeping or other military operations, as opposed to the 
effective control test, which requires meticulous evidence of every single action being 
effectively directed by the responsible authority.270 Looking from a procedural perspective for 
victims of foreign military contingents, this seems an almost impossible burden of proof to 
bear to private individuals, who may not get access to specific chains of command, rules of 
engagement etc. or other materials that could provide evidence of effective control. 
The ECtHR took the overall control approach in the famous Behrami/Saramati case271. The 
question there was whether the death of some Kosovar Albanians (Behrami) caused by 
undetonated cluster bombs and the allegedly unlawful arrest and detention of another 
individual (Saramati) were to be attributed to the state contingents complained of, or rather to 
the NATO Forces (KFOR) or to UN forces (UNMIK) that had the mandate to de-mine and 
detain persons suspected of criminal offences, hence ultimately to the UN (since both forces 
acted under the authority of the UN Security Council). The states claimed that the KFOR 
exercised effective control in Kosovo, and that UN had ultimate or overall authority and 
control.272 The ECtHR decided that the claims of the plaintiffs were inadmissible, because the 
conduct was not attributable to the states that were under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, nor was it 
attributable to NATO but the ultimate authority and control was exclusively with the UN, 
which authorized their presence in Kosovo. 
The Behrami/Saramati case was plagued by so many inconsistencies, also with the ECtHR’s 
own jurisprudence and therefore it was rejected by the ILC.273 It has been suggested that the 
ECtHR mistakenly focused on questions of attribution rather then resolving the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR.274 The ECtHR decision was also confusing, because it seemed to refer to the 
‘overall control’ test, but used the expression of ‘ultimate authority and control’ and failed to 
separate it with the notion of ‘effective control’.275 
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Nevertheless, the Behrami/Saramati case does demonstrate the complexity of applying the 
attribution of conduct rule in Article 7 of DARIO and the ambiguous concept of ‘effective 
control’, not to mention the confusion that even international tribunals seem to have in 
resolving the internal rules of an international organization as lex specialis deserving of an 
exception to or as unaffecting in the realm of international law.  
In the Behrami/Saramati case the ECtHR did not address the issue of the supremacy of Article 
103 of the UN Charter and the ECtHR failed to argue effectively in favour of the overall, or 
ultimate and overall control test and the default rule of attribution continues to apply: being 
organs of the state the conduct of the troops will be attributable to the state, under Article 4 of 
the ARSIWA.276 The same conduct may also be attributable to an organization, but it requires 
more than mere attribution to the organization for that conduct to cease being attributable to 
state.277 
The ILC has said it to be 'hardly controversial'278 argument that the effective operational 
command or control by an organization is required for attribution of conduct to that 
organization and it seems to be the scholarly consensus.279 However, there is a relatively high 
threshold for fulfilling the requirements of effective control.280 Further, the notion of effective 
control is closely linked with the military concept of ‘command and control’ and its 
applicability in non-military circumstances as fitting by analogy is questionable. 281 Although 
DARIO commentaries provide examples on the applicability of the ‘effective control’ test in 
non-military circumstances, it does not make specific elaborations.282  
According to the Special Rapporteur Gaja, what matters is not exclusiveness of control, which 
for instance the UN never has over national contingents, but the extent of effective control. 
This leaves the way open for dual attribution of certain conducts.283 
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2.3.3.3. Dual attribution and joint responsibility: the relationship of state and international 
organization 
 
Relating to attribution of conduct, one usually assumes that the fulfilment of positive criteria 
of an international organization corresponds to negative criteria with regards to a state or 
another international organization. However, similarly, as with the responsibility of states, 
under Article 7 of DARIO, a conduct can be ‘simultaneously attributed to an international 
organization or one or more of its members,’ states or other international organizations.284 
Legal subjects are evaluated on their own actions and nothing prevents concurring 
responsibility for the same wrongful conduct.285 Responsibility for certain conduct may be 
attributed to more than one subject of international law by dual attribution.Dual attribution 
often, but not necessarily leads to joint or joint and several responsibility.286 Joint or joint and 
several responsibility does not necessarily depend on dual attribution. The responsibility of an 
international organization, jointly with a state or another international organization may come 
into question also in a situation where an international organization ‘aids or assists’ or ‘directs 
and controls’ the commission of an internationally wrongful act or ‘coerces another’ entity to 
commit an internationally wrongful act or circumvents its international obligation through 
member states.287  
With regard to infringements of international humanitarian law, according to the Secretary-
General of the UN, a ‘concurrent responsibility’ of the UN and the state might take place 
depending on the circumstances.288 One may have to conclude for joint attribution of the same 
conduct; however, one could also consider that the infringing acts are attributed to either the 
state or the UN, while omission, if any, of the required preventive measures is attributed to the 
other subject.289 Similar conclusions may be reached regarding infringements by members of 
UN peacekeeping forces, that affect the protection of human rights.290 
According to the Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, however, even though a conduct that is 
required by an international organization and is exercised by member states, does not mean 
that the conduct is attributed to the international organization and not to the member states.291 
Looking at the practice within the European Communities (EC) in relation to the UN SC 
                                                 
284 Ibid. at 3, para. 6. 
285 An example can be found from cases surrounding the NATO bombings of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 1999. Several members of NATO were sued by Serbia and Montenegro in cases were examined by 
the ECtHR in App. no. 52207/99, Bankovic, Decision 12 December 2001. The application was declared 
inadmissible by the ECtHR. The English text of the decision was reproduced in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 
vol. 85 (2002), at 193; and ICJ in Legality of use of force cases. Eight cases are still pending while the ICJ 
removed two cases from the Court’s list. 
286 Second report on the responsibility of international organizations, supra note 130, at 3-4, paras 6-8.  
287 DARIO Chapter IV, Articles 14-17. 
288 Financing peacekeeping operations, A/51/389, supra note 241, at 11, para. 44. The Secretary-General’s 
‘Bulletin on observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law’ (ST/SGB/1999/13, at 1) does not 
address the question. 
289 Second report on the responsibility of international organizations, supra note 130, at 20-21, para. 42. 
290 Ibid. The United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) has conducted investigations on 
charges of sexual exploitation in various countries. See also e.g. Jennifer Murray, Who will police the peace-
builders? The failure to establish accountability for participation of United Nations civilian police in the 
trafficking of women in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, (2002-
2003), at 475-527, especially p. 518 ff. 
291 App. No. 13258/87, M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission of Human Rights, 
Decision of 9 February 1990, Decisions and Reports, vol. 64, at 138. 
44 
resolutions, it seems that the two international organizations are not evaluated in the same way. 
For instance a claim for damage caused by a search of weapons on a ship in Djibouti the Office 
of Legal Affairs of the UN Staff stated that ‘The responsibility for carrying out embargoes 
imposed by the SC rests with member states, which are accordingly responsible for meeting 
the costs of any particular action they deem necessary for ensuring compliance with the 
embargo.’292  
In the EC practice the approach is different. The EC has exclusive competence related to the 
common commercial policy. The implementation of the requirements of these types of 
agreements is left to member states’ officials and according to the Director-General of the 
Legal Services of the EC, due to the ‘vertical’ structure of the EC system, the actions of member 
states authorities should be attributed to the EC itself regarding both actions taken on the EC 
level and member state level.293 The attribution to the international organization in this case is 
due to its exclusive competence; otherwise it may apply, according to ILC, in a situation where 
an organization commits to an obligation where the compliance depends on its member states. 
When the member states would fail, the responsibility would be attributed to the 
organization.294 Applying the ARSIWA, the conduct would be attributed to the member states, 
but according to the ILC ‘special developments’ in an organization with regards to integration, 
could indicate the responsibility of the international organization, such as the EC and the 
attribution of conduct does not need to be addressed.295  According to a decision by the ECJ 
both EC and its member states are jointly liable for ‘commitments that they have undertaken’296 
The responsibility of an organization could be engaged by way of attribution of responsibility 
when no reference is made to attribution of conduct.297  
The question of dual attribution has been contended in many courts, related to the debate over 
the responsibility for the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995. In July 1995, during the 
Bosnian war, the UN Peacekeeping force of the Netherlands, the DUTCHBAT, created a safe 
haven in Srebrenica. Around 300 people were residing in the compound when the Serb forces 
surrounded Srebrenica and the safe haven fell the Serb forces took over Srebrenica. The 
relatives of more than 7000 victims of the massacre have held the Netherlands and the UN 
responsible for the deaths. In the latest verdict, in July 2014 the Hague District Court found 
that the Netherlands was responsible for the deaths of 300 individuals who were sheltering in 
the safe haven created by the DUTCHBAT, 298 upholding earlier verdicts in the matter, e.g. 
Nuhanovic and Mustafic-Mujic et al.299  
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The Court of Appeal of The Hague in Netherlands has taken a strong approach to dual 
attribution and in Nuhanovic, it held that under Articles 7 and 48300 of DARIO, it was possible 
that both the Netherlands and the UN had effective control over the same wrongful conduct .301 
Attributing the conduct to the Netherlands does not, according to the Court, determine whether 
the UN also had effective control so that it could be attributed with the wrongdoing.302 
Regarding the responsibility of the UN, the Dutch Courts and the ECtHR have found the UN 
immune from process and its responsibility therefore outside its jurisdiction.303 The District 
Court of The Hague pronounced on the immunity of the UN: 
‘[U]nder the UN Charter the state has bound itself to warrant as much as possible the immunity 
laid down in the Charter, irrespective how far it extends” and that “pleading the immunity [of 
the UN] in proceedings before a national court of law at least falls within the bounds of 
possibility”.304 
It should be noted in comparison that in Behrami/Saramati305 the ECtHR did not even consider 
the possibility that attribution of conduct may be dual or even multiple, i.e., that the same action 
or inaction can be attributable both to a member state or states and to an international 
organization. Fast-forwarding to 2001, in Al-Jedda, the ECtHR essentially admits the 
possibility of dual or multiple attribution of the same conduct to the UN and to a state.306 The 
ECtHR did not acknowledge any of the criticism that the Behrami/Saramati decision received, 
but was content to say that the situation in Iraq does not satisfy either the ILC’s ‘effective 
control’ test or its own test of ‘ultimate authority and control’, without telling which one applies 
and why.307 
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2.3.3.4. Problems with attribution of conduct under Article 7 of DARIO 
 
Attribution of conduct is a very complicated concept already in a general sense. Professor 
Klabbers discusses the fundamental problem of attribution called ‘paradox of obligation’308, 
where the problem lies with chains of command which exist in every types of bureaucracies. 
The superior gives orders to the subordinate, generally with some type of discretion, which 
then dilutes the order by giving some discretion to the subordinate. This places the eventual 
responsibility for the action ordered by the superior, on the shoulders of the subordinate and 
the superior is not considered involved in more then perhaps lack of supervision.  
This seems to be reflected in relevant practice regarding international organization in 
international law, even though it has been submitted under the doctrine of command 
responsibility that superior officers should be targets of prosecutions rather than their 
subordinates. Command responsibility or superior responsibility is a doctrine of hierarchical 
accountability of war crimes. It may be referenced to in government, military law or with regard 
to corporations and trusts.309 
Questions of whether Article 7 of DARIO is generally applicable were also raised by 
international organizations in their commentaries. For instance the European Commission 
provided commentary in 2011 and noted that the ILC commentary to Article 7 relates mostly 
to UN practice and jurisprudence of the ECtHR, questioning whether there is sufficiently 
identifiable and settled opinio juris supporting the codification of the Article as a standard for 
interpreting the rule of ‘effective control’.310 The EC also submitted that article 7 seems to 
reflect a perception that international organizations tend to escape responsibility for 
international wrongs.311 
What is also difficult in regards to attribution of control to an international organization is the 
importance given to the internal rules of international organizations in attribution of conduct. 
Specifically, with the UN, the internal rules of the organization, which have developed in 
peacekeeping as standing practice, as part of international law, where the UN itself is not seen 
responsible for member states’ implementation of SC resolutions or other obligations deriving 
from UN membership. In Behrami/Saramati the ECtHR discussed the internal rules of the UN 
and practices at length, arriving at a conclusion that it affects attribution, whereas some legal 
scholars have considered the institutional rules completely separate from rules of 
responsibility.312 However, it seems that strict separation of the two is impossible as has been 
expressed above in the chapter regarding rules of the organization as lex specialis. Further, 
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during the drafting of the DARIO attention was given to the issue, raised by the European 
Commission, of whether a ‘special rule of attribution of conduct’ exists for the EC and ‘other 
potentially similar organizations’, with regard to the attribution of acts of member states 
implementing binding acts of the relevant organization to that organization.313 Special 
Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja goes on to say that ‘the outcome of the discussion on the wider 
question does not settle the issue of the existence of a special rule on attribution concerning a 
category of international organizations, or even only an individual organization, in their 
relations to states and other international organizations.’314 
Article 7 was an issue of debate and concern until the very end of the drafting process of the 
DARIO. For example the UK, France and Poland expressed concern over the lack of precision 
provided for applying the ‘effective control’ test and its general applicability to situations other 
than peacekeeping by the UN.315 According to Poland except for extraordinary circumstances 
of States ordering its organs, placed at the disposal of an international organization, to act 
contrary to the directives of the latter, responsibility should be borne by the international 
organization at whose disposal the organ is placed by virtue of the mere fact of the transfer. 316 
Article 7 would be therefore not a general rule, but applied only to exceptional 
circumstances.317 
In light of all the criticism and commentaries to Article 7, it can be seen as progressive 
development of international law by the ILC. Even the commentaries provided by the ILC itself 
appear to confirm the controversial character of adopting the effective control test to 
international organizations.318 Especially difficult will be to apply the test in non-military 
contexts. The ILC relied heavily on UN practice to demonstrate the applicability of the 
effective control test in the realm of international organizations, although the UN itself 
considered it contrary to its own practice.319 
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2.3.4. Ultra vires conduct, inconsistent practice 
 
International organizations are are vested with powers that are entrusted with them320 and in 
situations where the practice of an international organization develops in a way that is 
inconsistent with its functions, its constituent instrument, the Special Rapporteur Gaja suggests 
that this might be solved with a provision on ultra vires conduct.321 Ultra vires conduct of an 
international organization could be either conduct beyond the powers conferred on an 
international organization or conduct exceeding the powers of a specific organ of the 
organization.322 An act that is ultra vires for an organization is also ultra vires for any of its 
organs.  
Article 8 of DARIO expresses the rule regarding excess of authority or contravention of 
instructions: 
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of 
that organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an official capacity and 
within the overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority of 
that organ or agent or contravenes instructions. 
The Article has to be read in context with general provisions on attribution of the DARIO, 
especially Article 6.323 Article 8 of DARIO follows closely the wording used in Article 7 of 
ARSIWA. In the commentaries the expression ‘in that capacity’ is key, requiring a close link 
between the ultra vires conduct and the organ’s or agents functions.324 In the ARSIWA 
commentary the text ‘indicates that the conduct referred to comprises only the actions and 
omissions of organs purportedly or apparently carrying out their official functions, and not the 
private actions or omissions of individuals who happen to be organs or agents of the state’.325 
The Article 8 makes this clear by referring to ‘acts in an official capacity and within overall 
functions’ of the international organization. 
According to the ICJ in Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a special 
rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights326 that all acts that exceed the scope of their 
functions of organs or agents of international organizations, even those that are not the officials 
of the organizations, may be attributed to the international organizations that they represent.327 
The position taken by the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN in a memorandum concerning 
claims involving off-duty acts of members of peacekeeping forces: 
‘UN policy in regard to off-duty acts of the members of peacekeeping forces is that the UN 
has no legal or financial liability for death, injury or damage resulting from such acts. [...] We 
consider the primary factor in determining an “off-duty” situation to be whether the member 
of a peacekeeping mission was acting in a non-official/non-operational capacity when the 
incident occurred and not whether he/she was in military or civilian attire at the time of the 
incident or whether the incident occurred inside or outside the area of operations [...] [W]ith 
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regard to UN legal and financial liability a member of the Force on a state of alert may none 
the less assume an off-duty status if he/she independently acts in an individual capacity, not 
attributable to the performance of official duties, during that designated “state-of-alert” 
period. [...] [W]e wish to note that the factual circumstances of each case vary and, hence, a 
determination of whether the status of a member of a peacekeeping mission is on duty or off 
duty may depend in part on the particular factors of the case, taking into consideration the 
opinion of the Force Commander or Chief of Staff.’328 
According to the memorandum, a conduct deemed off-duty may not be attributed to the UN 
and the on-duty conduct would be. I have to concur with Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja 
when he wonders how any ultra vires conduct relates to the functions entrusted to the person 
concerned.329 
The responsibility for ultra vires acts is important, because denying attribution of conduct may 
deprive third parties of all reparation, unless conduct may be attributed to a state or anothe r 
organization.330 Even then, dual attribution and joint and several responsibility has to be 
considered. The need to protect third parties requires attribution not to be limited to acts that 
are regarded as valid under the rules of the organization.331 This would mean the rights of 
victims of wrongful acts committed by entities connected to the international organization. 
It seems that the determination of ultra vires acts as attributable to an international organization 
will be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, what should remain clear and a stable rule 
is that an international organization, which the organ is representing, should make every effort 
in investigating any types of allegations of wrongful conduct and advocate and ensure proper 
reparations are made to the third parties, be they compensations or prosecutions.  
What has been the reality in UN peacekeeping missions sadly is that the UN has washed its 
hands completely regarding serious allegations of gross human rights violations and crimes by 
personnel in peacekeeping missions and has not made any efforts to even dismiss the persons, 
let alone advocate transparent prosecutions or proper reparations for victims by the troop 
contributing states. 
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Part III. Content of international responsibility / Internationally wrongful acts / 
Primary rules 
 
3.1. General 
 
The rules of international responsibility in general, are secondary rules, which continue to 
apply in an identical fashion across multiple fields of primary rules.332 Primary rules, the 
undertakings of international organizations, determine the boundaries of the conduct of 
international organizations. There is an internationally wrongful act of an international 
organization when an action or omission constitutes a breach of an international obligation of 
that international organization.333  
International organizations are parties to treaties and make agreements with other subjects of 
international law, and they are bound by those undertakings. Also the rules of the organization, 
present some boundaries to the conduct of international organization, however, a violation of 
the rules of the organization entails its responsibility, not for the violation of the ‘rule’, as such, 
but for the violation of the international law obligation it contains.334  
It is generally accepted that the same principles that make an internationally wrongful act of a 
state, apply also to international organization.335 A wrongful act, which results in the 
responsibility of an international organization, may be a breach of a treaty obligation, breach 
of customary international law, unilateral promises or general principles of international law.  
There are debates on whether the responsibility of an international organization can arise from 
acts where there is no dolus or culpa, blameworthiness present.336 Regardless of intent, if 
another party suffers for the actions of another, the injured party should be compensated.337  
The ICJ held in WHO v. Egypt338 that ‘International organizations are subjects of international 
law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are 
parties.’339 International organizations are bound by jus cogens and secondary rules of 
international law.340 Obligations that are not jus cogens may not be binding on international 
organizations, unless they are party to the specific treaty or other instrument establishing the 
obligation. There is still a theoretical gap concerning the legal basis of obligation for 
international organizations.341 Often enough breaches of norms may be a result from pursuing 
a legitimate purpose of policy, i.e. humanitarian interventions by UN peacekeeping operations.  
But what are the jus cogens norms that bind international organizations. 
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According to the Article 26 of DARIO violation of peremptory norms of international law 
cannot be justified by circumstances that preclude wrongs, such as consent or distress. The 
international community has a legal interest in the protection of certain basic rights and the 
fulfilment of certain essential obligations.  
In relation to state responsibility the ICJ noted in the Barcelona Traction case that:  
‘an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a state towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another state in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all states. In view of 
the importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.’342  
Peremptory norms are ‘the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also … the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination’.343 The ICJ has reaffirmed this idea in later cases.344 The 
consequences of international responsibility are not limited to bilateral situations. 
Peremptory norms of international law are binding on international organizations in the same 
way as they are on states.345 All subjects of international law are bound by jus cogens, be they 
states, international organizations or others.346 In his fifth report to the ILC, the Special 
Rapporteur Gaja indicated that both international organizations and states can breach 
obligations jus cogens, peremptory norms of general international law, and therefore there is 
no reason to treat an international organization in a different way.347 However, the application 
of certain peremptory norms may be problematic.348 
Clearly accepted and recognized peremptory norms ‘include the prohibitions of aggression, 
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to 
self-determination’349, and added that, clearly, international organizations, like states, may not 
invoke a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in the case of non-compliance with an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm.350 
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3.2. International human rights norms 
 
The development of human rights law in the later half of the twentieth century has been the 
main reason why the role of individuals has risen to a prominent position. Some writers have 
argued that the primary subject of international law is the individual.351 One of the most 
influential British international lawyers of last century Hersch Lauerpacht has said that: 
‘Fundamental human rights are rights superior… [and must lead to the] consequent recognition 
of the individual human being as a subject of international law’.352 Professor Philip Allott sees 
the international society arising from the ‘self-creating of all human beings’353 
The universal human rights system that has the greatest variety of participants in ideological, 
cultural, political and socio-economic terms than any other regional human rights regime is 
closely linked to the UN.354 The universal human rights system was created by the UN Charter 
and UN organs authorizing bodies and posts that are concerned with protecting human rights; 
the SC, GA; the Human Rights council, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human 
Rights.355 In addition there are working groups and rapporteurs and each human right treaty 
has their own committee.356  
Traditionally, the protection of human rights is the duty of states. Under the States have a legal 
duty prevent human rights violations and use means at its disposal to carry out investigations 
for violations in its jurisdiction, to identify and punish the responsible and ensure adequate 
compensation for the victims.357 Many human rights instruments obligate states to respect and 
ensure the respect of human rights in specific treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR)358 and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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(ICCPR).359 Many human rights treaties and declarations have become internalized and 
constitutionalized and influence how people think about issues.360 
This is the standing premise and even in situations large-scale disasters or armed conflicts, the 
primary responsibility of protecting human rights rests with the host state, regardless of in the 
presence of international assistance from international organizations or other states.361  
 
 
3.2.1. Responsibility of international organizations for protection of human rights 
 
As mentioned above, human right that are considered peremptory norms, are binding also on 
international organizations, such as the basic rights of the human person. However, 
international organizations rarely are parties to human rights treaties. Therefore, the challenge 
of seeking to show that that international human rights law is applicable to the activities of 
international organizations is a central. The respect of and responsibility for violations of 
human rights by international organizations is vital considering the significant influence 
international organizations have globally to the lives of million of individuals. 
The UN, the main focus of this study, has a unique position in the midst of different 
international organizations: the UN itself is the producer and protector of many of the most 
fundamental human rights treaties. 
Scholars have suggested three alternative ways in reasoning the responsibility of the UN to 
follow human rights. 362 The first argues that UN bodies have sufficient personality to be bound 
by human rights law and that general principles of international law, including jus cogens 
norms and customary international law, can and do bind them in many circumstances.363 
According to Barrister Mark Pallis, this creates a situation where an organization could be 
bound by custom formed through a process, which it had not contributed to.364 However, the 
UN is the protector and creator of the core universal human rights treaties and therefore, one 
could argue, that the UN has participated in creating the jus cogens norms, through its various 
organs and bodies that have made reports and recommendations over the course of decades. 
The vocabulary of universal human rights instruments and how the binding norms have come 
to fruition, started with the UN. 
A second approach to applying human rights law to the UN relies on the fact that one of the 
purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms. This leads to the idea that ‘the UN is bound by international human rights standards 
as a result of being tasked to promote them by its own internal and constitutional legal order, 
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without any added judicial finesse.’365 This argument seems to leave areas of indeterminacy 
when it comes to defining precise rules and precise legal consequences of particular actions. 366 
However, the task of the UN in promotion of human rights has evolved from a traditional 
international organization to having ‘quasi-sovereign’ powers in global governance, especially 
when equipped with territorial control.367 
A third approach considers the ‘quasi-sovereign’, state-like functions exercised by the UN, and 
leads to the idea that the UN must respect international human rights when it is exercising 
functions that have been transferred to it by a state.368 This can be seen as a firmer legal basis 
than the other approaches, although the idea is hampered practically because many of the states 
where the UN operates are not party to international human rights treaties, or have entered 
numerous reservations.369 It is also often unclear whether stately functions have actually been 
transferred to the UN. Pallis submits that the UN should be bound just because an obligation 
theoretically exists on a host state and the UN should be prohibited from offering a lower 
standard of protection than the state in which it is operating.370 
All of the above approaches are valid arguments and are not mutually exclusive and looking at 
the arguments combined, one can make the assertion that there is sufficient basis in arguing in 
favour of obliging the UN to follow human rights. Simply because the UN is not a state per se, 
should not be a hindrance to applying human rights standards to its actions. The UN has 
developed as an institution protecting and promoting human rights, to one that has been given 
supranational powers over states and has taken state-like tasks.  
The notion of effective control is also used in connection with international human rights law 
as a threshold for the applicability of human rights instruments.371 ‘Effective control’ is used 
in international law to determine whether a state is an occupying power (and has effective 
control over the occupied territory), thereby having certain obligations pursuant to the laws of 
occupation. By analogy, the effective control test could also be applied to situations of 
international governance, such as was established in Kosovo by the UN under SC resolution 
1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999. The effective control over the territory of Kosovo is in the hands 
of the global administration that was set up in 1999.  
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Paul C. Szasz has written on the topic of UN special regime and how it has made legislation 
under its jurisdiction.372 According to Szasz, the UN has gone beyond relying on its immunity, 
but exercised ‘in legislation, establishing a particular tort regime’ under its jurisdiction on the 
territory of the UN headquarters.’373 This puts a new perspective on the development of the 
UN as an international organization even further towards states, as exercising control over a 
territory. If an international organization exercises jurisdiction over a territory, it should be 
seen as exercising governmental authority, which is essential in determining the responsibility 
to respect and ensure fundamental human rights. 
In the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (hereinafter UN Victims resolution)374, the responsibility of non-state actors 
was addressed insofar as they exercise effective control over a certain territory and the people 
in the territory.375 The victim-oriented perspective, allows victims to seek remedy and 
reparation on the basis of human solidarity and legal liability, beyond state responsibility. 376 It 
is submitted that although international organizations rarely exercise control over a territory, 
the principles of ARSIWA should be applied to international organizations, as far as 
possible.377 
In addition, one must also notice that there are various soft law instruments in the global level, 
such as resolutions, guidelines, recommendations, that despite their lack of legal authority 
evidence moral authority of international consensus on the matter and propositions of best 
practice.378 
According to J.D. Jennifer Murray, the UN has the moral duty under the UN Charter to hold 
itself and its agents to international human rights standards in accordance with its functions 
and purposes as an organization. The UN has a purpose ‘to maintain international peace and 
security ... in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’379 Therefore 
actions of the UN during peace operations should conform to international standards.380 The 
UN Charter imposes upon the UN the duty to promote ‘universal respect for . . . human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.’381  
According to Murray not holding the UN to the same standards it is charged with implementing 
and enforcing, compromises the legitimacy and effectiveness of peace operations, leading 
ultimately to the corrosion of its moral force. The failure of UN peacekeepers to comply with 
international law undermines the support to the mission in the host state and might endanger 
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its success. To the local population the difference between the UN and the troop-contributing 
state is invisible and the agreements over responsibilities between them is insignificant. The 
only thing they know is that an international organization that has come to uphold and build 
peace act in a very hypocritical way, when faced with their responsibilities.382 
The ECtHR said in Al-Jedda that Article 24(2) of the UN Charter required the UNSC to act in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN, one of which was the promotion of 
international human rights.383 The ECtHR, determined that, in the event of any ambiguity in 
the wording of a UNSC Resolution, the interpretation that was most in harmony with the 
requirements of the ECHR and which avoided any conflict of international obligations would 
prevail.384 The UNSC would have to use clear and explicit language in the respective resolution 
itself, if it intended states to take measures that would conflict with a state’s international 
human rights obligations.385 According to Professor Marko Milanovic, the Al-Jedda case is an 
important development, where the ECtHR has made a clear statement rule for interpreting SC 
resolutions that can go a long way in providing a meaningful human rights check on the UN 
SC.386 In Al-Jedda the applicant urged the ECtHR to rely on the ECJ’s decision in Kadi, and 
say that UN SC resolutions could not affect human rights protections under the ECHR it to 
declare that the ECHR is independent of the UN Charter and general international law, 
requiring it to fragment the international legal order to the benefit of human rights.387 In Kadi  
the ECJ held that guarantees of fundamental rights under EU law could not be displaced by SC 
resolutions.388  
UN has declared human rights as ‘fundamental’ to the organization.389 In 1948 the General 
Assembly drafted and adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights390 and the UN has 
adopted international human rights treaties and created the position in protection of 
fundamental human rights. The UN is involved in continuous discussion on how to reform the 
human rights treaty system and mechanisms.391  
The UN has shown concern over the enforcement and compliance of international law, and in 
many contexts has made disconcerted statements and pleas to uphold the rule of law. As to its 
own forces, the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by UN Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law392 Section 3 requires that in the SOFAs393 the UN ‘undertakes to ensure that 
the force shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general 
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel,’ that this obligation is to apply 
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even in the absence of a SOFAs, and that the UN will ensure that the members of the force are 
fully acquainted with these principles and rules; the agreements with troop-contributing states 
provides that the participants in peacekeeping operations ‘shall observe and respect the 
principles and spirit’ of these instruments.394 Consequently, full and ready compliance with 
demands made by the ICC appears to be completely consistent with the general posture of the 
UN.395 
One cannot forget that the UN has been fundamental in the establishment of international 
tribunals, the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL396 or the East Timor Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction 
over Serious Criminal Offences,397 and the establishment of extraordinary chambers in courts 
of Cambodia.398  
The reality of the UN’s own compliance with fundamental human rights norms is in 
contradiction to its principles. There is consistent evidence that forces acting under UN 
peacekeeping operations have been involved with human trafficking and the UN has stood idle. 
Human trafficking violates fundamental human rights and is prohibited under international 
law.399 Trafficking acts with slavery or slavery like practices may constitute crimes against 
humanity under the statutes of the ICC, the ICTY and the ICTR.400 The prohibition of slavery 
is a well-established rule of customary international law that attained the status of a peremptory 
norm.401 It has been argued that international opinio juris of the term, as evidenced by treaty 
law and UN resolutions, has evolved to include trafficking for sexual exploitation.402  
There are numerous reports about abuses sexual exploitation from also from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) by MONUC peacekeepers, and in most cases the investigations 
into the offences were not conducted respectfully in regards to the victims.403 According to 
reports, girls as young as ten years old, were raped and sexually abused by peacekeepers.404 
 The UN missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and in Kosovo (UNMIK) adopted a 
‘zero tolerance’ policy for staff members involved in trafficking or prostitution. According to 
the missions, this means that allegations of misconduct are investigated and disciplinary action 
is taken for those found guilty. There have not been any prosecutions only a few of the alleged 
perpetrators were sent home.405 A report prepared by UN independent experts on women, 
armed conflict, and peace building found UN policies to be ‘extremely ambiguous in regulating 
interaction between UN peacekeeping personnel and the local female population.’406  The 
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independent experts deemed the UN Code of Conduct to be nothing more than ‘a skeletal 
outline of basic human rights’ that ‘trivializes violations against women.’407 
 
 
3.2.2. The Rise of victims’ rights 
 
The historic evolution of human rights as an integral part of international law by endorsement 
and ratification of numerous human rights treaties calls for effective remedies for violations of 
human rights. Many human rights treaties make reference to circumstances, which are essential 
in humanitarian assistance, such as the right to life, health and livelihood and freedom from 
discrimination.408 Often the fundamental human rights of individuals in humanitarian crisis are 
dependent on the actions of international organizations and global governance in general. The 
host states are often crippled by the humanitarian crisis and unable to provide protection to the 
people in its jurisdiction. The people in affected areas of humanitarian crisis are left without 
effective recourse to demand the protection of their fundamental rights, when the state unable 
to provide those rights. The international humanitarian assistance that has come there to help 
them is considered to have no obligation to fulfil its promises. The rights of the victims of said 
violations would be then to address their state not those who were actually responsible for the 
violations. Victims of human rights violations by international organizations cannot be said to 
have an access to effective legal remedies. 
The right to effective remedies has been so widely acknowledged that it may be regarded as 
forming part of customary international law.409 Traditionally, civil and political rights, such as 
access to effective legal remedies have emphasized the rights of the accused, such as the 
presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial.410 The legalistic frameworks of legal 
remedies are usually focused on the nature of conflict or the context rather than dependent on 
the victims’ suffering.411 International human rights have developed towards the recognition 
of the rights of victims412 of gross violations of human rights and international crimes. The rise 
of victims’ rights has been a development of a new criminological theory, restorative justice, 
which emphasizes the rights of victims in a legal process. 
The UN GA has adopted two resolutions dealing with the rights of victims: the 1985 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the 
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2006 UN Resolution on Victims. The 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines are said to be a 
triumph for victims’ rights.413 
Provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of violations of international human rights 
law can be found in numerous international human rights instruments, in particular Article 8 
of the UDHC, Articles 2 and 14 of the ICCPR, Article 6 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 14 of the Torture Convention, and 
Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In relation to international 
humanitarian law, Article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land of 18 October 1907 (Convention IV), Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, and Articles 68 and 75 of the ICC 
Statute.414  
The ICC Statue is significant in the development of victims’ rights. ‘For the first time in the 
history of international criminal justice, victims have the possibility under the Statute to present 
their views and observations before the Court.’415 Article 68(1) of the ICC Statute provides that 
the ICC shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well -
being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. The ICC has a Victims and Witnesses Unit 
within the Registry, pursuant to Article 43(6), to provide protective measures and security 
arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear 
before the ICC and others who are at risk on account of testimony.416  
 
 
3.2.3. Victims’ rights to reparation 
 
The legal consequences of a breach of an international obligation are reparations. In the Factory 
at Chorzów case the ICJ ruled that: ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.’417 Reparations in 
an adequate form may mean any number actions, for instance monetary compensation or 
possibly prosecution of perpetrators. Reparation may apply also to moral damages.418 
The existence of an obligation to make reparation has often been acknowledged by 
international organizations.419 A particularly clear example may be found in a report by the UN 
SG on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of UN peacekeeping 
operations: ‘The applicability of international humanitarian law to UN forces when they are 
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engaged as combatants in situations of armed conflict entails the international responsibility of 
the Organization and its liability in compensation for violations of international humanitarian 
law committed by members of UN forces.’420 
The UN Victims resolution provides detailed descriptions of standards that should be followed 
and according to the resolution ensuring victims’ rights means the duty to take appropriate 
legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent violations, the duty to  
investigate, effectively, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible 
irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation and, the 
duty to punish the responsible persons and provide effective remedies to victims, including 
reparations.421 Moreover, in accordance with international law there is a duty to cooperate and 
assist international judicial organs competent in the investigation and prosecution of these 
violations.422  
Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights, and 
appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-
being and care should be taken to avoid his or her re-traumatization in the course of legal and 
administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.423  
It is submitted that there is a gap between international human rights law and international 
criminal law.424 The parallel nature of these two bodies of law limits the reach of international 
criminal law to punish fundamental human rights violations and they remain without effective 
enforcement.425 The concept of victims' redress needs to be developed in a more comprehensive 
way.426  The rise of victims’ rights has called for re-conceptualizing legal distinctions and 
technicalities of various classifications of crimes against victims.427 
As discussed above, the UN has taken responsibility for damages in private claims and paid 
damages. The UN Legal Counsel has also said that it would cease participation in cooperation 
with armed forces where there is suspicion violation of human rights or international 
humanitarian law. However, the UN does not seem to set the same standard to its own 
personnel or to forces acting under UN missions. On the contrary, according to reports, UN 
has made significant efforts to hinder investigations and has weak practices in relation to 
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protecting victims and providing them with access to justice; in reporting abuse as well as 
participating in the process. 
 
 
3.2.4. The UN practice on treatment of victims 
  
The UN SC has called for responsibility of peacekeepers involved in crimes:  
“Expresses its serious concern at allegations that some UN personnel may have been involved 
in sexual abuse of women and children in camps for refugees and internally displaced people 
in the region, supports the SG’s policy of zero tolerance for such abuse, looks forward to the 
SG’s report on the outcome of the investigation into these allegations, and requests him to make 
recommendations on how to prevent any such crimes in future, while calling on states 
concerned to take the necessary measures to bring to justice their own nationals responsible for 
such crimes428 
 
In issuing the Bulletin on Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian law,429 the 
SG took a step towards holding peacekeeping personnel accountable under international law. 
However, the full impact of this Bulletin is limited by the fact that, while it must be advocated 
through the SG’s Special Representative to all staff in the peacekeeping operation, enforcement 
is left up to troop-contributing states.430 According to the independent experts Rehn and Sirleaf, 
the troop-contributing states are neglecting to prosecute their soldiers. 431 When violations 
occur, the personnel are rarely even sent home for fear of adverse political consequences and 
because missions are typically understaffed. The UN Head of Mission does not have any 
authority to discipline troops or punish misconduct, but only general responsibility for conduct, 
which includes setting standards, training troops and investigating.432 Prosecutions that are 
carried out by the home country are generally not made public because they take place in 
military courts, which are closed procedures. As a result, much of the information on crimes 
committed by peacekeepers must be drawn from press accounts and reports of human rights 
organizations or generalized from the few countries that have dealt with the actions of their 
peacekeepers.433  
The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS)434 conducted an investigation in 2004-
2005 regarding the abuses of the MONUC peacekeepers in the Congo.435 The OIOS apparently 
set a high evidentiary threshold, which is questionable due to the fact that the victims in the 
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investigation were minors and the MONUC itself was receiving the complaints from the 
victims rather than an impartial third party, which creates an uneven balance of power between 
the alleged perpetrators and victims.436 Many peacekeepers were repatriated before the 
investigation was concluded.437 The investigation also lacked of transparency and the sexual 
abuse continued during the investigation. Further, the troop-contributing contingents 
reportedly actually disturbed the investigations and did not provide information to the OIOS. 438 
The report lead to a resolution by the SC to ensure the SG’s zero tolerance policy to on sexual 
abuse, and investigate and penalize those found to be responsible439. 
In Bosnia, despite professed commitment to prosecution of peacekeepers, the officers of the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) have enjoyed complete impunity.440 States retain 
jurisdiction over their peacekeepers under immunity provisions, but no state has invoked 
criminal jurisdiction for human trafficking violations in Bosnia.441 Moreover, UN officials 
have often been dismissive of allegations of peacekeeper involvement in trafficking and the 
requirement that governments inform the UN of criminal prosecutions has little meaning.442 
No member of UNMIBH has ever been criminally prosecuted for trafficking-related offenses, 
which ‘indicates that there is an obvious lack of political will to hold them accountable.’443  
In relation to the UNHCR, Mark Pallis writes that the OIOS should have the capacity to 
institute investigations into the UNHCR on its own initiative when the UNHCR is unwilling 
or unable to act, and request information and allow participation of refugees, in order to carry 
out its oversight functions effectively.444 Apparently investigations have delivered positive 
outcomes.445 However, with regards to victims in individual case, the OIOS is not the 
appropriate body to provide remedies, and direct complaints mechanism should not be 
substituted by OIOS investigations.446 
The combination of legal, political and moral arguments of the imperative to uphold human 
rights law, all work together to create a framework of rules by which the UN may reasonably 
be expected to follow. There have been positive developments, but not enough, much more is 
needed to make the academic progress a reality to victims on the ground and for the 
international legal system is far from being victim-oriented.447By honouring of victims, the 
international community expresses solidarity and reaffirms the principles of accountability, 
justice and the rule of law.448 
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Part IV Executing the responsibility of international organizations 
 
4. Privileges and Immunities  
 
4.1. General 
 
Even though immunity does not mean impunity, it often seems to lead to that regarding the 
responsibility of international organizations. This next chapter will look at immunities of 
international organizations, especially those of the UN, which often prevents investigation, 
prosecution or consequences for wrongful acts. The impossibility to take legal actions against 
international organizations and their personnel is seemingly in conflict with the fundamental 
human right of access to effective legal remedies.  In the end of the chapter there is discussion 
on the conditions of waiver of immunity and of the absoluteness of the immunities of the UN 
in relation to international crimes and serious breaches and also whether in the age of 
international tribunals, the absolute immunities are anymore justified. 
Under traditions over thousands of years representatives of states have enjoyed certain 
privileges and immunities, namely heads of state, state officials, diplomatic representatives and 
consuls. Most of the principles are codified in Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(hereinafter VCDR).449 Immunities have developed to ensure smooth conduct of international 
relations and international cooperation and promote mutual respect among states of their 
sovereignty and the right to protect their representatives abroad from possible abuses of the  
power and authority of the territorial state.450 
Immunities can be categorized in two different types of protections. Some officials enjoy broad 
immunity because of their status or office (immunity ratione personae), the immunity of others 
relates only to the acts that are performed in their official capacity, functional immunity 
(immunity ratione materiae).451 Personal immunities are conferred to those who are entrusted 
to represent the state at the international level.452 Personal immunities are given to senior 
officials, especially heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers.453 They also 
apply to diplomats and other officials on special mission in foreign states.454 State officials that 
are not entitled to immunity ratione personae are immune from states jurisdiction in relation 
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to acts performed in their official capacity.455 Immunity ratione materiae may be invoked by 
former officials, in relation to the performance of duties while they were in office.456 
Incumbent heads of state enjoy personal immunities in the widest extent and, when facing 
charges for international crimes, they are entitled to immunity from arrest and from criminal 
prosecution in the territory of foreign states under customary international law. State practice 
and the practice of the ICJ, specifically in the Arrest Warrant457 case458 support this rule. The 
Arrest warrant case handled an arrest warrant that was issued and circulated internationally by 
Belgium against the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo, alleging grave 
breaches of the Geneva conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols and crimes against 
humanity. The ICJ held that immunities cover not only the performance of official duties but 
also private acts.459 However, immunities that are attached to a particular office or status are 
valid only as long as the official holds that position.460  
Immunities and privileges of international organizations are based on necessity of international 
organizations to be able to fulfil their functions. The absence of immunity is considered to 
endanger the fulfilment of the mission of the international organization.461 In case the receiving 
states define private acts widely it might influence the success of the mission.462 However, the 
legal personality of an international organization does not imply that an organization is entitled 
to enjoy privileges and immunities from non-member states under international law.463 
There is no general treaty or binding document that governs diplomatic relations of 
international organizations and its staff or those representing states to those organizations. 464  
The Vienna Convention on the Representatives of States in Their Relations with International 
Organizations of a Universal Character from 1975 is not in force and it has been criticised for 
focusing on the sending states rights at the expense of the host state.465 Law relating to 
privileges and immunities of international organizations consists of a myriad of treaties and 
other legal instruments and also domestic legislation. Usually each organization has its own 
treaty on privileges and immunities. In addition to the UN and EU treaties, international 
organizations sometimes use the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.466 
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It has been submitted that there is a rule of customary international law, according to which 
there is an obligation to grant privileges and immunities.467 However, there may be such a rule 
of customary international law, but as an unspecified rule it is not very useful to invoke that 
rule without any precision of its scope.468 The rationale behind the customary rule is, that when 
the immunities and privileges are awarded to official duties, all the duties of an organization 
would be covered by the immunities and privileges. The assumption that an organization would 
not act ultra vires makes the rule of customary international law on privileges and immunities 
unconvincing.469 In any case customary international law does not grant immunity from 
jurisdiction to acts performed in a personal capacity.470 
 
4.2. The Immunity of the UN: Functional necessity or absolute immunity? 
 
Privileges and immunities of international organizations are based on the theory of functional 
necessity; immunities are necessary in order for the international organizations to fulfil their 
purpose.471 Functional necessity means that international law grants substantive rights and 
obligations to international organizations conditionally, as opposed to states that have rights 
and obligations simply by their statehood, and are immune from suit for governmental 
activities, (acta jure imperii). The doctrine of implied powers, the principle of speciality means 
that international organizations and their organs can exercise functions that they were 
empowered to perform.472 
Immunity of international organizations is granted ratione materiae and not ratione 
personae.473 To warrant immunity for private acts is considered to impede the course of justice 
under the laws of the host state. It is considered unacceptable to extend immunities to all sorts 
of private acts.474  There are exceptions though and e.g. heads of secretariat of missions are 
usually endowed with the same immunities as diplomats.475 However, immunity for non-
official acts of international staff members is usually not granted to majority of civil servants. 
Functional immunity might sometimes expand to acts that are generally not considered official 
including acts such as walking the streets of the host nation, entering the country etc. 476 
Separating private acts from official functions is not clear and neither are rules regarding 
different groups of persons and the immunities are under constant and increasing debate.  
The principle of ‘functional’ immunity was established in the founding document of the UN. 
The UN enjoys immunities based on Article 105 of the UN Charter.477 However, a treaty can 
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bind only the parties to it, so the provisions bind only UN members. The ICJ determined in the 
Reparation for Injuries case478 that the UN has objective legal personality, opposable also vis-
à-vis non-member states, and presumably this holding also applies to the necessary immunities 
of the organization, and that these immunities must be respected not only by members but also 
non-members of the UN.479  
In order to make more specific provisions on the immunities of the UN, the UNGA adopted 
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN (CPIUN) in 1946 and the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (CPIUNSA) in 1947. 
Though not all members of the UN are parties to the said conventions, the provisions are 
recognized as an authoritative interpretation of Article 105(1) as to what privileges and 
immunities the UN requires in order to be able to fulfil its purposes.480 
The UN is said to enjoy functional immunity, however, it is often quoted as ‘absolute’, based 
on the wording used in Article II(2) of the CPIUN, which states that the UN shall enjoy 
immunity from ‘every form of legal process’. The ‘absolute’ immunity from suit of the UN is 
respected in most countries, though some national courts have tried to limit the UN’s scope of 
immunity along the initially envisaged ‘functional’ immunity.481 Absolute immunity is not 
equated to the doctrine of absolute state immunity recognizing nothing but acta iure imperii, 
not only due to the dispute settlement clause of Article VIII, section 29 of the CPIUN.482 The 
clause can be regarded as an acknowledgment of the right of access to court as contained in all 
major human rights instruments.483 The District Court of The Hague held in Mothers of 
Srebrenica case484 that ‘absolute immunity of the UN is the norm and is respected.’ 485 The 
Hague Court first established that the UN had invoked its immunity within the functional 
framework of a UN peacekeeping mission.486 According to Guido den Dekker, The Hague 
Court ‘correctly expressed that the UN enjoys absolute functional immunity.’487 However, the 
UN defines the limitations of its functions itself and does not subject its immunity under 
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independent review and has never waived its immunity. The practical difference between 
absolute immunity and ‘limited’ functional immunity is therefore unclear and the core of 
debate over functional immunities. 
Regarding different officials performing the functions of the UN, the basis and contents of their 
immunities are variable. The CPIUN contains privileges and immunities for three categories 
of persons crucial for the work of the Organization: 1) representatives of Member States; 2) 
UN officials; and 3) experts on missions for the UN. UN officials, i.e. permanently employed 
staff members, enjoy ‘functional’ immunity.488 The CPIUN stresses that ‘[p]rivileges and 
immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the UN and not for the personal benefit 
of the individuals themselves’.489 As opposed to UN officials, experts on missions for the UN, 
like members of the UN peacekeeping operations, serve under a temporary and specific 
mandate. They also enjoy certain functionally limited privileges and immunities.490 They are 
only immune from legal process to the extent necessary to perform their duties. However, the 
immunities awarded to officials of the UN apply even after they have left office.491  
The UN peacekeeping forces are not directly referred to in the CPIUN. It is possible to consider 
that they are covered by CPIUN Article VI as ‘experts on mission’. However, in fact, this 
appears never yet to have been used.492 The exact contents of the privileges and immunities of 
members of UN forces are unclear.493 One possibility is instead, that force members are 
afforded immunity from at least the criminal jurisdiction of the host state of the force by means 
of Status of Forces Agreements (hereinafter SOFA)494 concluded with the UN and any criminal 
jurisdiction is to be exercised by the troop contributing state.  495 The SG’s Bulletin about the 
application of the Humanitarian Rules of Warfare to UN Forces provides specifically that 
accusations of war crimes are to be tried by the troop supplying state.496 However, should the 
situation arise that the immunity of a member of a UN force has to be asserted in a situation 
not covered by any of these agreements (for example, vis-à-vis a transit state, or the national 
state of the soldier), then the UN would rely directly on Article 105(2) of the UN Charter, 
which so far has rarely if ever occurred.497 The conclusion that is compelling is that the term 
‘officials’ in the UN Charter is broader than that in the CPIUN and encompasses all persons 
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who perform functions for the UN, including members of the Secretariat, certain other 
appointees of the GA, experts on mission, and possibly also members of UN forces.498  
Military personnel of states, on a UN peacekeeping mission, are usually granted immunity from 
the host state jurisdiction and the troop contributing state retains exclusive jurisdiction on 
criminal prosecution and certain civil matters. The content of the immunities vary based on 
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). For civilian personnel (UN staff, experts on mission), 
the jurisdiction of the host state and third state is applicable. 
Based on functionality of the immunities, peacekeepers should not be able to assert immunity 
when they commit serious violations of human rights; as such acts clearly fall outside the scope 
of their official duties.499 For instance in Bosnia, the functional limitations on peacekeeper 
immunity has been completely ignored. The IPTF officers were completely shielded from 
criminal liability by a web of privileges and immunities afforded to them under international 
law and operation-specific stationing agreements, as well as the unwillingness of their home 
countries to prosecute their officers who were alleged to have committed acts human 
trafficking, among other acts, resulting in violations of fundamental human rights. 500 
According to Frederick Rawski ‘Recent [ICJ] jurisprudence indicates that there has not yet 
developed a customary international law, exception' to jurisdictional immunity even in cases 
of gross human rights violations if an alternative forum for prosecution exists or may exist in 
the future’.501 
Professor Klabbers has argued that functional immunities are biased in favour of international 
organizations, based on the benevolence assumption of the actions of international 
organizations.502 This is an especially fitting description regarding international humanitarian 
organizations, such as the UN. Professor Klabbers put it well saying that ‘It is one thing to say 
that organizations shall be immune from suit to the extent necessary to their functioning, but 
why should third parties who have seen a deal go sour, be victimized by the necessities of the 
organization?’503 Klabbers writes that there is a flaw in the theory of ‘functional necessity’, 
where the functional needs of an organization are put before those of others. He goes on to say 
that the idea of functional necessity requires justification, while there has so far not been 
convincing arguments.504 Also, although the theory is helpful in determining the scope of the 
immunities and privileges, the question of what is necessary in terms of the functions of an 
organization remains unanswered and is a relative question. 
One could also go further to question the necessities of extent of functional immunities. 
Although there is limited information about the actual extent to which international 
humanitarian operations have resulted in legal claims, some surveys have been conducted. 
According to a survey conducted under the Disaster Law Programme of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), claims and liability concerns are 
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not creating important disruptions in international relief and recovery activities.505 Although, 
one could argue that activities of the UN and especially involving military operations, are more 
prone to liability claims, the survey could provide some perspective on the necessity of such 
strict interpretations of the UN over its immunity. The survey included intergovernmental 
organizations but also many NGOs that do not enjoy any immunity and are completely 
subjected to host state judicial processes. According to the survey, only 32 % of humanitarian 
organizations reported to having had claims filed against them, most of them being contractual 
issues. Respondents to the IFRC survey also reported that neither claims nor fears of liability 
were a hindrance their operations.506 Only 3 % of international humanitarian organizations 
reported substantial impediments from the potential of criminal investigation or arrest.507 
 
 
4.3. Waiver of immunity 
 
According to the ICJ, pursuant to Article 105 of the UN Charter, states have an obligation to  
provide their national courts with information on the position of the UN regarding its immunity 
in a given case, and must ensure that the national court deals with the question of UN immunity 
expeditiously and as a preliminary matter.508  
According to the CPIUN and the CPIUNSA the UN has ‘the right and duty’ to waive immunity 
if the immunity would impede the course of justice and are against the interests of the UN and 
can be done without prejudice to UN interests.509 The immunities are submitted to be not for  
the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but for the interests of the UN.510 Article 5 
of the VCLT requires parties to treaties to perform their treaty obligations in good faith and it 
is extended to a constituent instrument of an international organization and member have a 
duty to act as good members.511 Would it not then be natural to expect the same from the UN, 
to waive immunity when it is required? States respect the immunity of the UN, but the UN 
should hold its end of the agreement and respect the jurisdiction of states and their 
responsibility of protecting human rights by waivering immunity. 
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Whether the functional immunities apply, that is to say that the words and or actions are related 
to the persons’ official capacity is to be decided by the SG.512 The state that wishes to challenge 
the immunities and the position of the SG513 can be challenged judicially through requesting a 
binding advisory opinion from the ICJ.514 Politically the GA or a competent Council may 
challenge the SG decision.515 This has never been done. Obviously, there is no motivation of 
any of these entities that are entitled to challenge the immunity to do so. On the contrary, it 
would be political suicide. The real motivation to challenge the immunity should come from 
an independent party that has nothing to gain or lose for challenging the immunity. An 
international tribunal might provide the answer.  
The UN has always invoked its immunity in any international legal proceedings within the 
functional framework mentioned (Article 105(1) of the UN Charter as detailed in Article II(2) 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the Convention), 
using Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and that no 
exceptions have ever been made in practice.  
 
 
4.4. International crimes and the rise of international tribunals 
 
There is a rule that removes immunity ratione materiae concerning international crimes. 
According to an established rule, the official position of individuals does not exempt them from 
individual responsibility for acts that are crimes under international law.516 There are a number 
of cases where a foreign national court has prosecuted persons entitled to immunity for 
committing an international crime. It has been argued that acts that amount to international 
crimes cannot be seen as official acts, even while officials in question possesses immunity 
ratione materiae.517 It is submitted that international crimes are jus cogens norms, peremptory 
norms that cannot be violated and enjoy a higher status than immunity rules.518  
International criminal law has developed to allow domestic courts to prosecute crimes that have 
universal jurisdiction. For instance The Torture Convention519 defines the offense of torture to 
acts that have been committed specifically in the exercise of official capacity and allows 
universal jurisdiction and upholding immunity ratione materiae would be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Torture Convention.520 Immunity ratione materiae must be regarded as 
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having been displaced by the rule according universal jurisdiction for acts of torture.521  In 
addition, genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
other war crimes related to armed conflict that are under the jurisdiction of the ICC, are often 
committed in an official capacity of a government and therefore, immunity ratione materiae is 
inconsistent with these provisions.522 However, the ICJ523 and ECtHR524 and many national 
courts have rejected the view that violation of jus cogens norms would be superior to immunity 
rules.525 In the Mothers of Srebrenica et. al.526 case the District Court of the Hague arrived at 
the conclusion that there is currently no ground for an exception to the rule of immunity within 
the framework of enforcement through civil law of the standards of jus cogens, like the 
prohibitions on genocide and torture. This means there is no ground for prioritizing conflicting 
standards of international law or weighing of interests.527  Article 6 of the ECHR (or Article 14 
of the ICCPR) does not give a right to bring the UN before a domestic court on the single basis 
of the right of access to a court as guaranteed by it.528 It has been submitted that Article 103 of 
the UN Charter does not always and right away bring relief in the event of conflicting 
obligations of a peremptory nature or conflicting human rights obligations of an international 
customary law nature.529 The ICJ however, has been more strict with its interpretations.530 
The creation of international tribunals for the prosecution of international crimes has ceased 
the exclusive jurisdiction of states. According to Paola Gaeta, although allowing jurisdiction 
to international tribunals is against the rationale of personal immunities, their jurisdiction 
‘cannot be conceived as an expression of the sovereign authority of a state upon that of another 
state, nor can their judicial activity be considered as a form of ‘unduly’ interfering with the 
sovereign prerogatives of another state’, because they act on behalf of the international 
community as a whole.531  
In order for international tribunals to have jurisdiction, the instruments creating those tribunals  
have to expressly or implicitly remove the relevant immunity, and that the state of the official 
concerned is bound by the instrument removing immunity.532 Some scholars have suggested 
that courts established under SC resolutions, such as the ICTY, are universal and therefore need 
not be accepted by a state in order for it to prosecute officials who otherwise enjoy immunities. 
In the Taylor case533, the SCSL relied upon its international nature and insisted that the rules 
of international law on personal and state immunity have no bearing whatsoever in respect to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by international criminal courts.534 It noted that rules of state 
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immunities aim at protecting the sovereign equality of states and have therefore no bearing on 
the functioning of international criminal courts, which exercise their mandate on behalf of the 
international community.535 In addition, no has claimed that the ICTY violated the immunities 
of the incumbent president of the FRY Slobodan Milosevic, when it issued an arrest warrant 
against him.536  
In the Arrest Warrant case the ICJ stated that personal immunities constitute a bar only to the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by national courts and that this is not the case with international 
criminal courts. The ICJ referred specifically to a number of international courts and tribunals 
such as the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. With regard to the ICC, the ICJ referred to Article 
27(2) of the ICC Statute, which provides that ‘immunities…which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person’.537 
Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute contains an explicit denial of international and national law 
immunities. It provides: ‘Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.’ Article 27(2) conclusively establishes that 
state officials are subject to prosecution by the ICC and that provision constitutes a waiver by 
states parties of any immunity that their officials would otherwise possess vis-à-vis the ICC.538 
The Article 27 could open the avenue to criminal prosecution of UN peacekeepers.539  
International law has developed in the recent decades more and more towards accountability 
and abolishing impunity. Although the functional immunity of the UN is a problem, essentially 
the problem comes down to lack of jurisdiction.540 The jurisdiction of international tribunals is 
usually referencing only states and not international organizations.541 The ICC is not in a 
position to assert any jurisdiction over the UN, and cannot grant it immunity. However, the UN 
has an agreement with the ICC and The ICC as an international, independent tribunal, could 
be the answer. The Statute offers ample safeguards against politically motivated prosecutions 
and is relevant only when national authorities fail to act.542 In the Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement between the ICC and the UN, the UN has promised to cooperate with and assist the 
work of the Court. Specifically, Article 19 of the Agreement states that: 
“… the Court exercises its jurisdiction over a natural person who is alleged to be criminally 
responsible for a crime or crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and who, pursuant to the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Privileges and 
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Immunities of the United Nations or other agreements concluded by the Organization, enjoys 
privileges and immunities in connection with his or her work for the Organization, the United 
Nations undertakes to cooperate with the Court in such a case or cases and, if necessary, will 
waive the privileges and immunities of the person or persons concerned in accordance with 
the provisions of the relevant instruments.”543 
Presumably in most instances any accusations of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
would not relate in any way to official functions of the UN or its officials, and thus the question 
of immunities should not arise. 544 The SG would merely indicate that the acts in question are 
not covered by any UN immunities, and thus there is no obstacle to the ICC exercising its 
jurisdiction.545 If immunites were an issue,546 the UN would either waive any such immunity 
or to deprive the person of the status on which such immunity is based. 
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Part VI Conclusions 
 
5. Main findings of the study and recommendations for research 
 
In recent decades international organizations have evolved into powerful entities that challenge 
the hegemony of states in the international arena. The international community has started to 
see that even international humanitarian organizations make mistakes and abuse the powers it 
has been given. The DARIO are an attempt of resolving the lacuna of accountability that exists, 
but the effects the DARIO may have in carrying out the responsibility of international 
organizations, remains to be seen.  
The progressive draft by the ILC was opportune, but a lot remains to be desired for its contents. 
At the core of the criticism are not just the provisions on attribution of conduct and lex specialis 
of the DARIO, but also the principles how international organizations are approached as 
subjects of international law.  
The legal personality of international organizations is defined from the standpoint of states.  
States are seen as the supreme holders of powers, legal subjects sui generis that are above other 
subjects of international law. International organizations were originally created as tools for 
states in order to reach common goals, but they have developed as institutions and the UN for 
instance, possesses supranational powers. International organizations today exercise 
governmental functions, which are usually performed only by states, such as legislative and 
judicial functions, even territorial control. The exercise of state-like functions should be 
followed with state-like obligations. The form and shape of the legal person should not be the 
decisive factor in deciding the duties of international subjects, but their functions and practices 
in reality. 
The definition of international organizations comes from the standpoint of states and it also 
affects the definition of the rules of the organization. Although the ILC adopted a very specific 
definition of the rules of the organization, it does not resolve the inconsistencies that result 
from the dual nature of the rules of the organization as part of international law and as internal 
rules for the purposes of specifying hierarchies and competences within the international 
organization. Regarding the ARSIWA, the role of internal laws of the state, are very clear, with 
international organizations, the separation of purely institutional internal rules and genuine lex 
specialis, is not. 
I concur with Professor Brölmann, who submitted that the formal legal landscape, of dividing 
law as either municipal or international, needs to be reconstructed. The role of the rules of the 
organization is dual, partly closed, partly open, partly institutional partly international law, 
which allows loopholes by way of invoking lex specialis. General international law may not 
automatically have normative force within the legal order of the international organization. 547 
To summarize the problem of lex specialis: there seems to be no general rule of responsibility 
that can override institutional law of international organizations.548 
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On the other hand, lex specialis has an unclear relationship to other maxims of interpretation 
and resolving norm conflicts, e.g. the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori.549 One 
interpretation gives priority to the rule that is later in time, over the special rule550 This could 
give way to interpret lex specialis in the light of the lex posterior developments of international 
law. International law has increasingly changed towards ending impunity, and grown more and 
more towards protecting third parties and victims. One could argue that invoking a lex 
specialis, such as an agreement between the UN and member states, that limits liability, is  no 
longer be justified in the current legal atmosphere. 
The rules of the organization apply in the attribution of conduct to an international 
organization. Regarding attribution of conduct, the problematic provision is Article 7 of 
DARIO. The conduct of an organ or agent that is placed at the disposal of an international 
organization is said to be attributable to the organization, if the international organization had 
effective control over the conduct.  
In UN peacekeeping there usually often is an agreement between the troop-contributing state 
and the UN, where the state retains control over disciplinary and criminal matters. According 
to the model contribution agreement relating to military contingents placed at the disposal of 
the UN in peace operations, the UN is liable towards third parties, but it has a right of recovery 
from the contributing state under circumstances such as ‘loss, damage, death or injury [arising] 
from gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the personnel provided by the government’.551 
The agreement governs the relations between the parties to the contract may not deprive a third 
party of any right that the party may have towards the state or organization which is responsible 
under general international law.552 The UN may not make agreements where the rights of the 
third party are limited. According to the UN Secretariat UN peacekeeping operations are 
subject to the executive direction and control of the SG, or under the overall direction of the 
SC or the GA, and that an act of a UN peacekeeping force would always be attributable to the 
UN.  
The UN has assumed responsibility in private law claims many times and it invokes its right to 
seek recovery from the contributing member state. The UN has not taken the same attitude in 
criminal matters or human rights violations. Even though the UN does not have jurisdictional 
authority on the troop-contributing states, it could provide proper reparations to victims and 
claim recovery form the member state that is unwilling to carry out their responsibility. The 
UN has actually been unwilling to demand any assurances or place consequences for member 
states that have been uncooperative with OIOS investigations or neglected to prosecute 
offenders. 
According to Article 7 of the DARIO, agreements of responsibility may not affect the general 
rules of attribution and despite agreements, conduct of an organ or agent placed at the disposal 
of an international organization, is attributed to the entity that had ‘effective control’ over the 
conduct. The effective control test was modelled from the ARSIWA and along the lines of the 
Nicaragua case553. During the drafting of the DARIO, the ‘overall control’ test or ‘ultimate 
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control’ test were considered, but the ILC ended up rejecting it, due to the extensive criticism 
the Behrami/Saramati judgment of the ECtHR received. As was submitted by the ILC, it did 
not have a lot of jurisprudence regarding the responsibility of international organizations at its 
disposal, so seems it had to make decision of rejecting the jurisprudence of the ‘overall’ or 
‘ultimate control’ based on limited practice, basically based on just the Behrami/Saramati 
decision. However, the unsuccessful decision of the ECtHR should not have persuaded the ILC 
to reject the ‘overall control’ test. The ‘overall control’ was used in the Tadic case and 
according to Professor Cassese, is more reflective state practice than the effective control test. 
Moreover, the ‘effective control’ test requires a high evidentiary threshold, which will prove 
problematic to fulfil.  
Article 7 of DARIO also permits dual attribution and the same conduct may be attributed to 
more than one entity. In the Srebrenica trials in the Netherlands, dual attribution was taken into 
consideration and in in Nuhanovic, it was held that it was possible that both the Netherlands 
and the UN had effective control over the same wrongful conduct. However, the dual 
attribution could not be confirmed due to the fact that UN invokes its immunity in every 
instance and has never subjected itself to any investigation or judicial review 
Universal human rights are the common heritage of all democratic nations today. The ideals of 
democracy and the respect for the rule of law, call for accountability in every form of 
government. Traditionally, states are the primary bearers of responsibility in following 
international human rights norms, but the evolution of international organizations alongside 
states and beyond them as governmental powers, makes them responsible. 
In humanitarian crisis, the affected state is still considered accountable in providing human 
rights protections to its people. However, the host states are usually burdened by the crisis and 
often are unable to provide even the basic needs, let alone equipped to conduct investigations 
and prosecute crimes committed by relief or aid personnel within their jurisdiction. The 
international organizations that arrive in the affected state are often there armed with mandates 
for the protection human rights. International organizations should therefore at least comply 
with the standards it sets. Furthermore, the UN, has been mandated to exercise governmental  
powers, including control over territories, such as the interim administration that was created 
in Kosovo. It is not justifiable that the global administrators have no accountability for their 
actions. 
International operations are also often run with a sense of urgency and on an ad hoc. 
Humanitarian crisis are sudden and require speedy actions, but international humanitarian 
organizations, such as the UN have operated in similar circumstances for decades, so the lack 
of accountability mechanisms for personnel are not justified. The basic necessities of life 
should obviously be priorities, but there is no legal hierarchy between human rights. 554 UN 
needs to see the reality on the ground and not having proper accountability mechanisms in 
place is not acceptable. A proper, independent system needs to be placed to gain oversight over 
international organizations. 
In recent decades human rights and international criminal law has brought the role of victims 
to the forefront. The ICC Statute is significant in the development of victims’ rights and it is 
historically the first time victims have the possibility to present their views and observations 
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before the ICC. The UN Victims resolution of 2006 allows victims to seek remedy and 
reparation on the basis of human solidarity and legal liability, beyond state responsibility. The 
resolution addresses also non-state actors that could be applied to international organizations.  
While it is recognized that high officials and representatives are in political positions that could 
make them vulnerable to politically motivated prosecutions, the interpretation of functional 
immunities should not lead to impunity. International organizations interpret their immunities 
strictly and on their own accord. It seems that the immunities of the UN have formed to be 
more absolute then the immunities of heads of states. The UN has never waived immunity, 
even though it has the obligation to do so under the CPIUN. 
International tribunals could provide an impartial and independent review over the conduct of 
international organizations, and the UN should be open to that. After all, although international 
tribunals are independent, they have been created by or under the protection of the UN. Also, 
good defences against accusations of UN personnel having committed crimes may exist, 
however, these would have to be established at a trial before a court and for this purpose a 
waiver of immunity is necessary.555 
Article 5 of the VCLT requires parties to treaties to perform their treaty obligations in good 
faith and it is extended to a constituent instrument of an international organization and member 
have a duty to act as good members.556 States respect the immunities of the UN, but the UN 
should hold its end of the agreement and respect the jurisdiction of states and their 
responsibility of protecting human rights and waive immunity. 
The current legal atmosphere where international organizations exercise increasingly more 
state-like functions, but enjoy unlimited and absolute immunities, is hard to justify in time 
where and the calls for accountability of states and end to impunity have increased. Especially 
in international an administration, where the use of force is allowed and international 
organizations and other entities who enact those powers are the true government, which decide 
upon the rights of the individuals, the lack of judicial remedies for victims and accountability 
of international organizations is difficult to justify in terms of rule of law.557 Unlimited 
privileges and immunities in circumstances of international administration are ‘incompatible 
with recognised international human rights standards’.558 For decades, the UN has tried to 
review its policies and implement ‘zero-tolerance’ policies on abuses by peacekeepers, but 
little has changed. It is high time for the UN to take its own advice and allow transparent, 
independent review over its conduct. 
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